Analysis of the policy and process of voter registration in South Africa in the 1999 general elections by Mlitwa, Nhlanhla Boyfriend Wilton
ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY AND PROCESS OF
VOTER REGISTRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA IN THE
1999 GENERAL ELECTIONS
Nhlanhla Boyfriend Wilton Mlitwa
Assignment Presented in Partial Fulfilment
of the
Degree of Master of Philosophy (Political Management)
at the
University of Stellenbosch
Supervisor: Prof. D.J. Kotzé
March 2000
\
DECLARATION
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original
work and that I have not previously submitted it in its entirety or in part at any university for
a degree.
Date
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ABSTRACT
The democratic order is still in its early evolutionary stages in South Africa. Although the
success of the 1994 democratic elections kindled hope for a promising future, democracy
needs to be safeguarded if it is to develop in South Africa.
Safeguarding a democracy requires a constant scrutiny of governing policies and procedures
to ensure that they remain conducive to its positive development. Of fundamental importance
to the transmission of democracy is an electoral system and its policies. Any election-
governing policy that reduces public confidence in the electoral system is not conducive to
the development of a democracy. This study analyses the policy of voter registration as it
directly impacts on the format of an election. Since this policy is being applied for the first
time in the short history legitimate democratic elections in South Africa, the study looks
beyond the noble objectives as given by the policymakers. The lEC and the Government
argue that the policy is aimed at improving the legitimacy of the electoral system by
eliminating the ID related forms of electoral fraud. The significance of the study lies in its
critical analysis of the actual policymaking process of this legislation, as well as its
implementation. In order to assess the democratic legitimacy of the policymaking stage, the
study takes a closer look at the roles of all the stakeholders in the policymaking process.
Further, the study describes the constitutional controversies of the provisions of the policy, as
well as its actual registration process.
The understanding behind the latter description is that a policy is of no use if it cannot be
implemented. In short, by describing, explaining and analysing the policy from its historical,
legislative, and implementation phases, the study gives an insight into how this new policy
relates to the development of the South African democracy.
Although this study found no conclusive evidence of the negative impact of the policy on the
outcome of the election, the nature of debates, the practical difficulties of implementation by
the IEC, as well as the Court debates have all raised new questions that could require further
analysis.
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OPSOMMING
Die demokratiese bewind in Suid-Afrika is tans nog in die vroeë stadia van ontwikkeling.
Hoewel die sukses van die demokratiese verkiesings in 1994 die vertroue in die moontlikheid
van 'n belowende toekoms laat styg het, moet voortdurend gewaak word teen afbreek van die
demokrasie in Suid-Afrika, en ruimte gemaak word vir die verdere ontwikkeling daarvan.
Die beveiliging van 'n demokrasie verg aanhoudende noukeurige beskouing van die regering
se beleid, en die uitvoer daarvan, om te verseker dat dit die positiewe ontwikkeling van die
demokrasie bevorder.
Die verkiesingstelsel en beleid is van fundamentele belang vir die vestiging van demokrasie.
'n Beleid wat die algemene vertroue in die verkiesingstelsel benadeel, sal nie die
ontwikkeling van enige demokrasie bevorder nie. Hierdie studie ontleed die direkte invloed
van die kieserregistrasie-beleid op die formaat van die 1999 verkiesing.
Aangesien hierdie beleid vir die eerste keer in die kort geskiedenis van Suid-Afrikaanse
verkiesings toegepas word, kyk die studie verder as die edele doel beoog deur die skeppers
van die beleid. Die OVK en die Regering beweer dat die beleid gerig is daarop om die
regverdigheid van die verkiesingstelsel te verbeter deur die uitskakeling van ID-verbonde
verkiesingsbedrog.
Die studie is veral belangrik in die kritiese ontleding van die skeppingsproses van die beleid
self, sowel as die implementering daarvan. Om die demokratiese regverdigheid van die
skeppingstadium van die beleid te kan beoordeel, val die soeklig veralop die rol van alle
deelnemers aan hierdie proses. Die grondwetlike probleme met dele van die beleid sowel as
die registrasieproses word beskryf.
Hierdie beskrywing word gedoen vanuit die oogpunt dat 'n beleid geen doel kan dien tensy
dit geïmplementeer kan word nie. Kortliks, deur die beleid te beskryf, te verduidelik en te
ontleed in sy historiese, wetgewende en implementeringsfases, gee die studie 'n insig in die
verhouding van hierdie nuwe beleid tot die ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse
demokrasie.
Hoewel geen afdoende bewyse van 'n negatiewe invloed van die beleid op die uitkoms van
die verkiesing deur hierdie studie bewys is nie, is sake wat verdere ontleding kan verg
geopper in verband met die aard van die besprekings om die beleid, die praktiese moeilikhede
van implementering deur die OVK, asook die besprekings in die hof.
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1CHAPTERl
INTRODUCTION
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The success of the 1994 general elections marked the birth of a legitimate multiparty democracy
in South Africa. The majority of South Africans as well as the rest of the democratic world
regarded this first democratic election as a major success in that it brought an end to four
decades of undemocratic rule, and heralded a new democratic order in the country. Whether this
new order can be regarded as a success depends on its sustainability in the long run, considering
the record of unstable and conflict-dominated governmental changes in Africa as well as in other
third world countries. Sustainability of this order, as most conflicts surrounding governmental
transitions in Africa and Latin America would indicate, will require a sound electoral system
(Chloe & Darnolf, 1999:2-6). A sound electoral system is characterised by, among other things,
an election management body whose chief function is to conduct legitimate elections (Chloe &
Darnolf, 1999:5); legitimate in so far as they are being conducted freely and fairly, by an
impartial election management body (Chloe & Darnolf, 1999:12-14; Pastor, 1999). The
Independent Electoral Commission (lEe) in South Africa is one example of an election
management body; other examples are discussed under the Rationale section below.
The breakdown of a political order as a result of questionable electoral processes in most
African States suggests that there is a need for caution when making electoral policies. I A
greater part of this caution, according to this statistic, should require the continuous existence of
a credible and effective management of an electoral process if democracy is to be consolidated
(Pastor, 1999:5) in South Africa. Particularly, as Pastor (1999) argues that no democracy is
perfect, special safeguarding mechanisms against electoral fraud in young democracies should
be encouraged. A formulation of legislative policies and procedures to minimise, if not
eliminate, chances of electoral fraud could be one mechanism required to strengthen a
democracy. In addition, such policies should not be impossible to implement if they are to
enhance the credibility of an electoral system (Pastor, 1999).
In trying to understand the legitimacy of an election in a democracy, it has become necessary to
introduce the notion of election management bodies, whose main function is to plan, manage
In as much as Ghana and Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1979, democracy was shortlived as ethnicity
and economic mismanagement, among other things, let to the return of military governments in the late 1980's
(Breytenbach, 1996). The failure of election recognition and the return to civil war in Algeria, as well as the
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2and to promote legitimate elections (Chloe & Damolf, 1999; Pastor, 1999). This function in
itself, involves a series of other dimensions such as the management of voter registration,
registration of political parties, managing balloting, counting of votes, and dealing with electoral
disputes, to mention a few (Chloe & Damolf, 1999:13; Electoral Act no 150 of 1993). Central to
this study is the function of the planning and management of the process of voter registration.
The significance of this function is that it determines the access of a citizen to the voting practice
(Pastor, 1999). Chloe and Damolf (1999:13) argue that: "If any electors are excluded from or
not registered for any reason, however deliberately or unintentionally, the election result may
not be considered legitimate because such systems lack the principle of the elector's civil and
political rights to participate in the election and express their opinion". According to Chloe and
Damolf (1999:13), an election management body should be impartial and independent of the
government or any political interference if it is to make free, fair and effective decisions.
Although the 1994 elections in South Africa were declared as free and fair, several political
parties suspected that democratic principles had not been strictly adhered to (IEC Election
Report, 1994). Complaints by political parties included allegations of non-citizens having voted
as well as certain persons having voted more than once. Furthermore, allegations were made that
certain political parties had transported their supporters from other electoral districts to vote in
districts where the party enjoyed less support (IEC Election Report, 1994). Despite a lack of
conclusive evidence for these allegations, the Government and the Electoral Commission
considered that the electoral system of the time did possess the potential for such abuse and
needed updating (interview: Russon, 14 July 1999). Lack of a voters' roll during the 1994
elections was identified by the IEC and the Government as the main factor that could have made
it possible for any of the above-mentioned electoral abuses to have taken place, if they had, in
fact, occurred (interview: Russon, 14 July 1999). To prevent such possibilities in future, the
Government and the Electoral Commission decided to update the electoral policies and
procedures. A major legislative update to the electoral process was the passing of Electoral Act
no 73 of 1998 that provided for the registration of voters for the 1999 general election. In
contrast to the 1994 election, the new Electoral Act requires that voters be registered on the
voters' roll in order to be eligible to vote. In terms of this Act, the Electoral Commission
requires that voters should be in possession of a single form of identification, a green barcoded
ID document, in order to register for voting (IEC Election Report, 1994: 64-71).
ethnic conflicts and the genocide in Rwanda are just a few examples of inadequate electoral processes
(Hampson, 1997; Kaufmann, 1996).
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3The requirements of barcoded identity documents resulted in serious disagreements among
political parties on the one hand, and the government and the IEC on the other, during the pre-
1999 election period. On separate occasions, both the New National Party and the Democratic
Party disputed the decision for barcoded ID's in the Constitutional Court. The parties questioned
the constitutionality of the decision insofar as it deprives certain people of the right to vote. The
decision for this policy raised further questions concerning to whose advantage and to whose
disadvantage it was made, and what political implications were involved. The reasons for, and
the process and implementation of the policy of voter registration, as well as responses to the
requirement of bar coded identity documents are focused on in this study.
2. RESEARCH QUESTION
The aim of this study is to explore the policy of voter registration in South Africa for the 1999
general elections, with special reference to the reasons for its formulation, how it was made,
what it entails, and how it is implemented. The part of the question "what it entails" attempts to
find answers to the following questions:
• Why voter registration in South Africa in the 1999 general elections, i.e. the influencing
factors?
• How was the policy of voter registration made?
• What are the goals and objectives ofthe policy of voter registration?
• What led to the decision that only barcoded identity documents are acceptable for voter
registration?
• Who was included and excluded in the decision-making process?
• Who are the stakeholders?
• When was the decision made, when and how is the policy being implemented (Time frame
of decision-making and implementation)?
• What are the challenges and difficulties of the registration process?
• How many potential voters, how many have applied, registered and how many voters were
rejected?
• What are the implications for the adoption of the policy of voter registration on the future
electoral processes, political participation and the consolidation of democracy in South
Africa?
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43. AIM OF STUDY
The aim of this study is to describe the policy and process of voter registration as it took place
for the first time in South Africa during the second general election of 1999.
4. RATIONALE
Voter registration means that only the people who are registered on the voters' roll would be
allowed to cast a vote on polling day. To be on the voters' roll requires potential voters to be
registered as voters. The process of voter registration sets out criteria for eligibility to register as
voters. This implies that South Africans who do not meet the criteria for voter registration are
automatically excluded from registering and voting.
Threats to the survival of new institutions such as the young democracy of South Africa are
often high in the early stages (Converse, in Pridham, 1990:11; Pastor, 1999:5). In fact, Pastor
(1999) argues that democracy often falters in developing countries with weak states and
bureaucratic incapacity accompanied by suspect electoral institutions. Where questionable
electoral systems exist, one political party often interprets electoral irregularities as intended to
harm its prospects, which leads to the decline of confidence in the actual electoral process. On
the contrary, stronger states and civil societies should be capable of forging electoral structures
conducive to the growth of a democracy (Pastor, 1999). According to the proponents of the
theory of democratic consolidation, weak states and weak civil societies are the primary threats
as well as necessary conditions for the failure of the consolidation of democracy (Liebenberg,
1990:45). Characteristics of weak states, according to Liebenberg (1990), and Pastor (1999)
include high rates of civil disobedience and crime. Essential requirements for a consolidation of
democracy, in contrast, include effective institutions for public participation and political
contestation, for the rule of law, and for public accountability (Breytenbach, 1996:2), all of
which would most probably indicate the existence of a stronger civil society. A favourable
environment for the consolidation of democracy, adds Breytenbach, includes socio-economic
conditions' such as: higher per capita incomes, growing economies, the prevalence of larger
middle and working classes, and viable civil societies. With South Africa's growing reputation
of high crime rates, and a growing rate of allegations of corruption in the civil service, the
question remains as to whether the South African State is not weakening, and if so, to what
extent and what the implications for the consolidation of its democracy are.
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5The danger for weak states that are democratising in the later part of the twentieth century, or in
what Huntington (1991) calls" The Third Wave" of democracy, is that they are more prone to
breaking down than advanced democracies situated in strong states. The return to authoritarian
rule by Nigeria in 1984, and the Sudan in 1989 are two examples of such a breakdown in
democratisation (Huntington, 1991 :208).
In contrast to a strong civil society, a weak civil society has elements of diffuse and divided
social, centrist impositions and élite politics (Liebenberg, 1990; Sartori, 1987). The legacy of
apartheid that still manifests itself in the form of economic inequalities, a divided politics in
terms of race, class and tribal or clan associations further highlights the presence of a weak civil
society in South Africa as described by Liebenberg (1990).
Another set of threats to the development of democracy, which could be the symptoms of the
existence of a weak civil society is an increasing culture of electoral fraud, the absence of free,
fair and effective, as well as impartial, electoral procedures (Chloe & Damolf, 1999; Pastor,
1999). A politically impartial election management body is required if these threats are to be
minimised, and the legitimacy of an electoral system enhanced (lEC Act no 150 of 1993).
The establishment of independent electoral commissions in Costa Rica and India after the
Second World War, and the establishment of a Federal Election Commission in the USA in
1974, to mention a few, confirm the need for an independent management of elections (Chloe &
Darnolf, 1999; Pastor, 1999). An electoral commission, according to Chloe and Darnolf
(1999:5), is one of the least partial election management bodies. Depending on the form of
democracy in a particular country, other election management bodies may include the
government, or a state agency. Examples of election management systems that are either
conducted by the government, government department or its agency can be found in Cyprus,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom (Chloe & Darnolf, 1999:3). Although Government dependent electoral
management structures may work well in countries with homogenous political actors, and with
already higher degrees of political stability, they remain risky for less stable democracies. The
danger of these structures in developing democracies with divided polities such as that of South
Africa is that they tend to lack independence of government influence and are least likely to be
regarded as entirely impartial, hence putting at risk the legitimacy of an election (Chloe &
Darnolf, 1999:8).
2 Also see Huntington (1991 :315-6) for more discussion on the effect of socio-economic conditions on
democratisation.
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6In pursuit of a legitimate electoral system in South Africa, the Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC), whose function is to prepare and manage elections, was established in 1993
(lEC Act no 150 of 1993). Since its establishment has set out the electoral policies in South
Africa, the policy of voter registration for the 1999 elections being one example of such a policy
(Electoral Act no 73 of 1998).
The policy of voter registration has a direct relationship to the extent to which the South African
citizen practises his or her basic democratic right to vote. The constitutionality and legitimacy of
this policy is essential to the acceptability of the electoral end result. As much as
constitutionality is significant, even more so is the success of the implementation of this policy
since its failure may put at risk the acceptability of the poll should other parties feel aggrieved
by certain procedures. However, when large numbers of South Africans participate fully in
elections and register with the necessary forms of identification documents, the legitimacy of
the electoral process may be enhanced as well as the well-being of the democracy as whole.
Legitimacy in this context refers to the extent to which the political parties and the general
public accept the electoral procedures under this policy, as impartial, reliable and binding (see
Chloe & Damolf, 1999:3-9 for an elaborate definition of legitimacy). Analysis of this policy
therefore carries a high degree of political significance since its success or failure may determine
the direction and the future of democracy in South Africa.
Since its inception in October 1998, the policy of voter registration in South Africa has been
clouded by political and implementational difficulties. The constitutional controversy regarding
this policy is that, whilst the constitution provides for a universal adult suffrage, the rules of the
policy are exclusive in terms of the types of identity documents that people should possess in
order to register for voting. The main provision of the policy is that people who cannot register
will not practise their constitutional right to vote (Electoral Act no 73 of 1998). Electoral
provisions require the possession of a barcoded identity document in order for a person to
register to vote and this excludes people who do not possess this type of identity document.
Further, even people who possess barcoded identity documents cannot vote if they have not
managed to register and are likely to feel aggrieved constitutionally. As a result, this may have
different implications for the electoral process.
It is from this point of view that this study sets out to describe this policy, as well as its actual
implementation, so as to improve the understanding of the concept and process of voter
registration, within the South African context.
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75. METHODOLOGY
This is an exploratory and descriptive study (for the requirements of this type of study see
Babbie, 1994; Nachmias et al., 1987). This study is also inductive in that it does not set out to
prove any theory or hypothesis, rather to describe the political, practical and structural trends of
the policy and process of voter registration in an attempt to learn more about their role in the
South African democracy.
5.1 Methodology
The actual methodological process is broken down into the following subheadings:
• Units of Observation
Units of observation include political and judicial documents such as the Constitution, the
Electoral Act no 73 of 1998, the Policy documents and regular update publications of the
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), media, Governmental and Non-Government
Organisational reports on voter registration.
• Data Source
The study makes a substantial use of primary and secondary data from the Independent Electoral
Commission (lEC), Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA), the Internet, and the media,
structured and unstructured interviews as well as academic and other functional texts. The media
material includes newspaper items, editorials, and other communication material produced in
monthly magazines by the mass media and other non-governmental organisations. Most of the
academic and legal data have been obtained from, among other sources, archival records of the
Universities of Stellenbosch and Cape Town, Government offices and organisations such as the
Human Science Research Council, the Internet, EISA and IDASA.
• Data Processing and Analysis
Since the data are qualitative, while the nature of the study is descriptive, the data are being used
directly from their sources in the descriptive chapters. In line with the aim of the study, i.e. to
analyse the policy and process of voter registration, chapters 2 and 3 focus on the policy making
process while chapters 4 and 5 describe the implementation of the policy of voter registration
from inception to completion. The data processing section therefore includes observations,
analysis, comparisons and description of primary and secondary data. The final section, i.e.
chapter 6, consists of the summary, conclusion, recommendations and bibliography.
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85.2 Definition of Terms
This section sets out to define the key terms used in this study, in the following order:
5.2.1 Electoral systemls
The electoral system is the procedural, structural, theoretical and practical policy of voting
which is adopted by the state in line with its political system in electing its political leaders and
governing structures. This concept also refers to formal voting procedures as well as to the
interpretation and distribution of votes among different politicians (Faure, 1999; Blais &
Massicotte, in LeDuc et al., 1996). Electoral systems can be divided into four categories, such
as:
(a) The Plurality-Majority Systems;
(b) Semi-Proportional Systems;
(c) The Proportional Representation (PR) Systems; and
(d) Mixed Systems
(Faure, 1999: 1-6; Blais & Massicotte, in LeDuc et al., 1996: 50-54; Reeve & Ware, 1992).3
There are various forms of a PR electoral system. Each form varies according to the method or
formula that is being used to distribute votes. The two basic options are 'highest averages'
methods which use a devisor, and the 'largest-remainders methods' (LR). The LR method uses
quotas, i.e. the Hare quota formula as used in Columbia, Costa Rica and Madagascar, as well as
the Droop quota formula as used in South Africa4 (Blais & Massicotte, in LeDuc et al.,
1996:59). The South African electoral system is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.
5.2.2 General Elections
According to The Oxford English Dictionary an election refers to "the formal choosing of a
person for an office, dignity or position of any kind, usually by the vote of a constituent body".
In the context of democratic politics, a general election refers to the choosing of the political
decision makers by the public through the voting process as determined by the political and
4
Majority systems are found both in single-member district states such as Australia and France, and in multi-
member constituency states as in the case of Mali. Examples of plurality systems can be found in single
member constituency states such as Bangladesh, Canada, India, Malawi, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, UK,
USA, and Zambia; in multi-member constituency states such as Thailand, in a two-member district state such
as Chile, and in a single- and multi-member constituency state such as South Korea. Mixed systems, i.e.
different versions of a plurality plus PR combinations can be found in countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Russia, Taiwan, and Venezuela. A combination of a Majority
and a PR (corrective) may be found in Hungary. See Blais and Massicotte, in LeDuc et al. (1996:49-83);
Reeve and Ware (1991), for an elaborated description of electoral systems.
LR systems may use a single tier, two-tier (i.e. South Africa) or multi-tier distribution method, probably to
reduce distortions resulting from the allocation of seats in the first tier (Blais & Massicotte, in LeDuc
(1996:60).
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9electoral systems of a country (Reeve & Ware, 1992; Manin, 1997). In South Africa, the
Electoral Act portrays this concept as the process by which the citizens vote to elect their
political representatives to both the National Assembly and the NCOP, Provincial Legislatures,
and Municipal Councils (The Electoral Act no 73 of 1998). This process, according to chapter 4,
section 49 of the final Constitution (Act no 108, 1996) of the Republic of South Africa, takes
place once in every five-year interval.
5.2.3 Identity Document
An identity document refers to a green barcoded South African identity document issued after 1
July 1986, in terms of section 8 of the Identification Act (Act no 72 of 1986), or a temporary
identity certificate issued in terms of the Identification Act (Act no 68 of 1997)5.
5.2.4 VoterRegistration
According to chapter 2 of the Electoral Act no 73 of 1998 voter registration is a process in
which a citizen of South Africa who is above 18 years of age registers for inclusion into the
voters' roll. The Act sets out criteria for voter registration. According to section 8(1) of the
Electoral Act the chief electoral officer is required to scrutinise the application and enter the
name of a person in the voters' roll when the officer is satisfied that such a person meets all the
requirements of the Act to qualify as a legitimate voter.
5.2.5 Voting Districts
This refers to the subdivisions of South Africa into 15 000 smaller, decentralised registration and
voting districts. In preparation for registration and voting, the lEC made use of the Geographical
Information System (GIS) to divide the country into these districts, and further, into 86 000
enumerator areas each containing between 120 and 150 voting households (Russon, The State of
the Voters' Roll, lEC, 1999: 2; EISA, 1998(1 ):2).
5.2.6 The "Zip-Zip" Machines
The Zip-Zip Machines refer to the electronic machines used for reading the barcodes on identity
documents. They were used by the lEC both during voter registration and during the actual
voting process (http://v.fVvw.icl.cominews/press/oct98/150ct.htm).
Also see Chapter I, section I(xii) of the Electoral Act no 73 of 1998 for a defmition of an identity document,
within the voting context. "tl TS8/$
~ '<-....;:: ~
;~ ~
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5.3 Abbreviations used:
ACDP
ANC
BCLR
DP
FA
HSRC
ID
IFP
IEC
NNP
PEO
PR
SACP
TBVC STATES
5.4 Chapter Summaries
Chapter 1
10
(African Christian Democratic Party)
(African National Congress)
(Butterworths Constitutional Law reports)
(Democratic Party)
(Federal Alliance)
(Human Sciences Research Council)
(Identity Document)
(Inkatha Freedom Party)
(Independent Electoral Commission)
(New National Party)
(Provincial Electoral Officer)
(Proportional Representation)
(South African Communist Party)
(Former Homelands of: TRANSKEI, BOPHUTHATSWANA, VENDA,
and CISKEl).
Chapter One introduces the study, providing the statement of the problem and the aim of the
study, together with notes on the methodology.
Chapter 2
This chapter looks at the constitutional and the legislative background of the policy of voter
registration from its inception until it became an actual policy. The section covers factors such as
political party influences, public opinion, legislative developments, and political developments
preceding the 1994 elections, during the 1994 elections and the results of the elections. The
chapter can therefore be described as the literature review section, covering the historical
background prior to 1994, the electoral system in South Africa, the 1994 elections as a
background, and the electoral legislative modifications prior to the 1999 elections. The chapter
further attempts to make a theoretical analysis of voter registration as well as to see if there are
other countries that also register their voters.
Chapter3
This chapter describes the decision for the policy and process of voter registration, and the use
of barcoded identity documents in South Africa's 1999 general elections. The chapter further
discusses the roles of the stakeholders such as the Government, the lEC, the individual citizen,
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and the political parties in the policy process. Finally, the greater section of the chapter discusses
the constitutional controversy surrounding the policy and the court cases.
Chapter4
This chapter describes the implementation process of the policy, with its provision for a
barcoded identity document, from inception to completion. In addition, practical and political
dynamics/implications as well as challenges are discussed. Finally, the chapter examines the
actual data of the number of potential voters who are registered and unregistered.
Chapter 5
The chapter describes the final round of voter registration.
Chapter 6
The final chapter gives a summary analysis, recommendations, a conclusion of the study, and a
bibliography.
5.5 Keywords
Barcoded identity documents
Electoral system
General Election
Voter registration
Voters' Roll
5.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter served to introduce the study. In so doing, the aim, research question, rationale, and
methodology of the study have been described. In addition, keywords of the study have been
outlined, together with summaries of the chapters. Further, this chapter attempts to define the
terms, as well as the abbreviations used in the study. The following chapter continues the
introduction by focusing on the description of the origins of the policy of voter registration. In
this respect, reference to legislative and constitutional developments, as well as to the 1994
electoral process is made in the chapter.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
12
CHAPTER2
THE POLICY OF VOTER REGISTRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA:
"DEVELOPMENTS TOWARDS THE POLICY"
1. INTRODUCTION
Proceeding from the previous chapter that served to introduce the study, this chapter attempts to
describe the formulation stages of the policy of voter registration. Reference was made in the
previous chapter to the complaints of different political parties regarding certain loopholes in the
electoral policies and procedures that governed the 1994 elections. Although the evidence of
allegations of electoral fraud could not be substantiated at the time, the nature of the allegations
had suggested that the electoral policies and procedures needed to be updated if the legitimacy
of South Africa's electoral system was to be enhanced. The electoral system allowed voters to
use different types of identity documents for voting purposes in 1994. This arrangement left the
electoral system extremely vulnerable to different forms of electoral fraud including votes by
non-citizens, persons voting more than once, as well as the unrestrainable movement of voters
between regions during elections (IEC Election Report, Oct 1994). To correct these
discrepancies in the electoral system, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the
South African Government decided to update the rules and regulations of elections prior to the
1999 elections. Chief of these new rules was the policy of voter registration and the provision
that voters should be in possession of a barcoded identity document (Barcoded ID) in order to
register and vote. This chapter covers the legislative background of this policy from its inception
until it became the legislation.
2. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS TOWARDS THE 1994ELECTIONS
The concept of democracy has been almost non-existent in the political history of South Africa
prior to ex-State President F.W. De Klerk's speech on 2 February 1990. (For an overview of this
period, see lEe Election Report, October 1994; Reynolds, 1994; Schlemmer, 1991 and 1994). In
his speech, De Klerk announced the readiness of the National Party to negotiate the democratic
settlement with the formerly banned political movements such as the ANC, PAC, SACP and
others (lEC Election Report, Oct 1994). De Klerk proved his sincerity by releasing Nelson
Mandela and other political prisoners during the same period. These developments were
followed by a series of political, racial and ideological confrontations, negotiations and
eventually, compromises, between the different political parties. Multi-party agreements were
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made at CODESA 1, CODESA 2 and in Kempton Park to determine, among other things, a type
of political and electoral system for a new democratic South Africa (lEC Election Report, Oct
1994; Schlemmer, 1991 and 1994). Among other things agreed upon by the political negotiators
prior to the 1994 elections was the creation of a structure known as the Transitional Executive
Council (TEC) that was to plan and prepare the way for democracy in South Africa. The Council
was drawn from the ranks of the negotiating parties. The State President of the time, Mr. F.W.
De Klerk, in collaboration with the TEC, passed the Independent Electoral Commission (lEC)
Act no 150 of 1993 that gave birth to the Electoral Commission. In conjunction with section 76
of Electoral Act no 202 of 1993, the Act prescribes that the IEC should organize, administer,
monitor and evaluate the electoral process in South Africa. The Act requires the IEC, in carrying
out its tasks, to be both structurally and administratively apolitical. This political independence
is crucial for the credibility of the functions of the Commission in the eyes of all political
stakeholders. The independence of the IEC will be explored further in later chapters.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE 1994
ELECTIONS
Towards the end of 1993 the Interim Constitution (Act no 200 of 1993) was drafted and passed
to provide for a political transition to democracy in South Africa (Faure, 1999; Schlemmer,
1991). This constitution divides South Africa into nine provinces with a National Parliament
consisting of the National Assembly and the Senate.6 In terms of section 6 of the Act (No 200
of 1993), provisions are made for a parliamentary system of government. Moreover, the
National Assembly and the Provincial legislature are to be elected through universal adult
suffrage. Under this arrangement the executive power is vested with the president who is elected
by the National Assembly. Section 21(2) of the Interim Constitution, and section 19 (1), (2) and
(3) of the final Constitution provide voting rights to all citizens. The Electoral Act no 202 of
1993 as promulgated in January 1994 sets out the basic rules for the National and Provincial
elections.
4. THE ELECTORAL ACT NO 202 OF 1993
The Electoral Act no 202 of 1993 gives detailed translations of the provisions of sections 21(2)
and 33(1)(b)(aa), chapter 3, of the South Africa Constitution (Act no 200 of 1993).
6 The Senate was changed, in terms of chapter 4, section 60 of the New Constitution, Act no 108 of 1996, into
the National Council of Provinces (NCOP).
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4.1 Eligibility to vote
Section 15(1) of this Act provides for the enfranchisement of all persons over the age of 18 years
who are ordinarily resident in South Africa. This section sets out the eligibility requirements for
voting for these persons. Voters are eligible to vote only if they can produce a South African
identity document or, according to section 17, a temporary voters' card which can be issued at
the discretion of the commission assigned to administer the electoral process (IEC election
report, May 1994:7-10).
4.2 The Omissions of the Act
The Electoral Act no 202 of 1993 was not perfect, and needed to be updated since it fell short in
not providing for key factors such as the voters' roll which is discussed next.
• Voters' Rolls
Electoral Act no 202 of 1993 does not provide for the preparation and the use of voters' rolls in
any election process. With the racial divisions and different identification methods prevalent in
South Africa during the years of apartheid, it could have been difficult to make use of a voters'
roll in the 1994 elections, even if provisions had existed (Interview: Russon, 1999). The reason
is that a voters' roll requires a uniform identification system which was non-existent under the
ethnically divided society of South Africa at that stage. This lack meant that different types of
identity documents had to be acceptable for voting purposes during the 1994 elections in South
Africa (Interviews: Lockey, 1999; Russon, 1999). The danger of this arrangement is that it left
the electoral system more vulnerable to abuse in terms of identification. Without a voters' roll it
became difficult for the IEC to verify genuine citizenship by the use of identification documents
(Interview: Russon, 1999). The exclusion ofthe provision of a voters' roll requires an alternative
method to safeguard against the possibility of each voter making multiple votes. What could be
regarded as a major deficiency of this omission is that the Electoral Act of 1993 did not provide
for any such alternative. Another consequence of the omission of the voters' roll is that it
became difficult to distinguish between enfranchised and disenfranchised prisoners during the
1994 elections (lEC Election Report, May 1994:7-10).
To address the problem of those citizens who are not in possession of valid South African
identity documents, section 17 of the Act allowed the IEC to use its discretion in issuing
temporary voters' cards (The Electoral Act no 202 of 1993: sec 17). The Independent Electoral
Commission however complained that the Act did not give practical provisions for dealing with
the possibility of migrant workers from neighboring territories who might attempt to vote (The
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IEC Election Report, May 1994: 10). Instead, section 35 of the Act requires voters to produce
identity documents and to have the voter's right hand marked with indelible ink as mechanisms
to safeguard against multiple voting in the election. This process requires the use of ink
detecting equipment as well as additional officers at each voting station, requmng more
administration, resources and possibly, allowing greater chance for error.
To redress the shortcomings of the omission in the Electoral Act of 1993, Electoral Act no 73 of
1998 provides for a voters' roll to be used in 1999 as well as in future general elections. In South
Africa the voters' roll refers to the national list of citizens who are registered as eligible voters in
terms of the provisions of the Electoral Act of 1998. It is only through the process of voter
registration that the name of a person is inserted on the voters' roll. The Electoral Act limits the
right to vote in the general elections only to persons registered in the voters' roll (Electoral Act
no 73 of 1998:14).
5. THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Prior to the 1994 elections, major South African political parties engaged in various democratic
negotiations. The electoral system debates are one example of such negotiations. Prior to the
adoption of the 1993 Interim Constitution, electoral categories of Plurality Majority Systems,
Semi-Proportional Systems, and the Proportional Systems remained at the centre of the electoral
systems debate. The adoption of the 1993 Interim Constitution reduced the alternatives in the
debate to the category of a Proportional Representation, largest remainder (LR)-Droop formula
type of electoral system in South Africa (Faure, 1999; Blais & Massicotte, in LeDuc et al.,
1996:49-83). As discussed in the definition section, the LR Droop formula of seats distribution
requires the use of a quota that corresponds to the total number of votes, divided by the number
of candidates to be elected plus one. In the second tier, remainder seats are awarded to parties
with the largest surpluses of unused votes, proportionately (Blais & Massicotte, in LeDuc et al.,
1996:49-83; South African Government Gazzette no 20201, 1999).
The Interim Constitution provides for a Proportional Representation form of Electoral System in
South Africa (Faure, 1999). The Centre for Constitutional Analysis of the Human Sciences
Research Council assessed the electoral systems of Brussels, Fiji, Germany, India, Mauritius and
Singapore in 1991 (Faure, 1999; also see report of the President's Council Committee on
Constitutional Affairs, 1992). In its findings the Centre recommended a Proportional
Representation system as ideal for the political culture of South Africa (Faure, 1999: 10). A
lengthy process of negotiations between political parties to arrive at an agreement for a common
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electoral system came soon after this findings. The result was the passing of the Interim
Constitution (Act no 200 of 1993) as well as the Electoral Act (No 202 of 1993). The
Proportional Representation system of South Africa provides for a Parliament with a National
Assembly of 400 members and a Senate (which became the NCOP in 1996) made up of 90
members elected indirectly by political parties from nine provincial legislatures (Faure,
1999: 10). The number of seats in parliament as well as in provincial legislatures is proportional
to the percentage of votes for each party (Faure, 1999: 10). The number of votes is crucial in
determining the allocation of seats, both in the provincial and the national legislatures. As a
result, the mechanism to control voter mobility between provinces is even more crucial for
provincial legislatures (See Electoral Act no 73 of 1998 for an elaborate description of the
process).
There are several reasons that led to the decision to adopt a Proportional Representation system
in the Interim Constitution in 1993. In the same year in which the Centre for Constitutional
Analysis (HSRC) recommended a PR system for South Africa, both the Democratic Party (DP)
and the National Party (NP) indicated their support for certain types of proportional
representation systems. In 1992 the ANC announced that its policy on electoral systems was that
of "... the election of representatives by the system of proportional representation ... [t]he ANC
favors a parliament consisting of the National Assembly and Senate. The National Assembly
will be elected by a universal adult suffrage on a common voters' roll according to proportional
representation ... " (Faure, 1999:4). In the same year, the now defunct President's Council
Committee on Constitutional Affairs also recommended a proportional polling system for South
Africa in the new Constitution in terms which are almost identical to the ANC proposals (Faure,
1999; Blais & Massicotte, in LeDuc et al., 1996).
Nurmi (1987) stipulates that proportionality considerations pertain to both the allocation of seats
to constituencies, and the allocation of seats to candidates within constituencies. In line with this
understanding the 1993 Interim Constitution provides for a PR system in terms of the allocation
of seats in the of national and provincial parliaments (Nurmi, 1987; for a practical example, see
S.A. Government Gazette, no 20201, 1999).
5.1 The Constitution and Voting rights
The Bill of Rights as set out in the final Constitution provides every citizen with the freedom to
make political choices (SA Constitution Act no 108 of 1996, sec 19(1), (2) and (3)). According
to section 19 of the Bill of Rights, every citizen has the right to free, fair and regular elections
for any legislative body established in terms of the Constitution and is entitled to make the secret
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vote of their choice. These provisions are in line with section 6 of the Interim Constitution Act
no 200 of 1993 which affords a universal adult suffrage to all South African citizens (The lEC
Election Report, April 1994:8).
According to the government structure and system, general elections in South Africa refer to the
process in which the citizens vote to elect a political party of their choice to run the state and/or
the country. The Constitution provides for general elections to be held once in an interval of five
years (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act no 108 of 1996, eh 4, sect 49(1». In
this process, voters are required to cast both the National and Provincial ballot in their vote. To
this end, the Electoral Act of 1998 entitles the lEC to decide on the number and structure of
ballot papers to be used in general elections (The Electoral Act no 73 of 1998, Sec 68).
5.2 The Constitution and the Electoral System
The Interim Constitution of 1993 provides for a Parliament with a National Assembly of 400
members directly elected on the basis of political party rankings (party lists), and a 90-member
Senate which is indirectly elected on provincial legislatures. For the National Assembly, 200
members of parliament are elected using the national political party list. The other 200 members
are elected on the basis of the regional party list with a fixed number of representatives for each
province. In this respect, the guiding provision is that such legislatures should have a minimum
number of 30 members (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act no 200 of 1993;
sections 40 and 127). As indicated in Table 2.1 below, the number of seats in the provincial
legislatures is not equal and is allocated in proportion to constituency sizes, and in accordance
with party strengths in the provinces (Faure, 1999).
Table 2.1: The Legislative system of South Africa
National Assembly Senate (As per Interim Constitution)
National Council Of Provinces or NCOP
350 to 400 seats (As per final Constitution)
Provincial Legislatures: 90 seats (54 permanent and 36 floating)
Minimum: 30 members per Legislature, and
Maximum: 80 members per legislature
Source: Faure M, 1999: 11; Final Constitution of RSA, eh 4; Electoral Act no 73 of 1998
There are. very few changes in electoral provisions between the Interim Constitution, the final
Constitution and the Electoral Act of 1998. The most noticeable change is the replacement of the
Senate by the National Council of Provinces as at February 1997. The Electoral Act no 73 of
1998, in contrast, indicates a drop in the maximum number of members of provincial
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legislatures from 86 to 80 which means that the 86 member Gauteng legislature should decrease
by six members after the 1999 elections," In addition, the Electoral Act no 73 of 1998 provides
for the election of a National Assembly through the elections held according to the electoral
system that is prescribed by legislation. This electoral system requires general elections to be
based on the common voters' roll, on a minimum voting age of 18 years, and to result in a
proportional representation (Electoral Act no 73 of 1998; Faure, 1999). Chapter 2 of the
Electoral Act of 1998 provides that any South African citizen in possession of an identity
document may register to vote. Thereafter, registered voters are inserted in the national voters'
roll and are entitled to vote on polling day.
6. VOTER REGISTRATION - A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Section 6 of the Electoral Act no 73 of 1998 outlines that a person should be a South African
citizen in possession of a valid identity document in order to register to vote. Section 6(2) of the
same Act allows the use of a temporary identity certificate that may be prescribed by the
Minister of Home Affairs for registration purposes. The Act further requires the applicant to
register and to vote only in the district in which that person is ordinarily resident (The Electoral
Act no 73 of 1998, sec 7(1)(b)). The Act prohibits the registration of any person who is not a
citizen of South Africa. It further prohibits the registration of any person who is declared by the
High Court as being of unsound mind, and a person who makes such an application in a
fraudulent manner. The Act also prohibits the registration of a person who makes such an
application outside the district in which that person is a resident (Electoral Act no 73 of 1998,
sec 8).
Although voter registration is still a new concept in the South African general elections, the
concept has been associated with some developed democracies such as the United States of
America (USA) and Canada for a long time. According to Claggett, (1990:197),8 in most
jurisdictions in the United States, voter registration prior to elections is necessary in order for a
According to schedule 3, section 114 of the Electoral Act no 73 of 1998 this maximum corresponds with the
quota formula of seat allocation required by the electoral system of South Africa, which should be uniform to
all Provinces if the National Assembly and NCOP seats are to be kept within certain limits.
Claggett indicates that there seems to be a difficulty in predicting voter turnout on the basis of voter
registration. He argues that having a particular number of voters registered does not indicate that the same
number would turn out to vote. In his survey study on registration validation among individuals in the USA,
he also discovered that people tend to be dishonest about their registration status. Most people who were not
registered indicated that they were registered. Some who were registered and wanted an excuse not to vote
said that they were not registered (Claggett, 1990). Any amount of public dishonesty on electoral matters
creates the potential for electoral fraud, hence the need for safeguard mechanisms.
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citizen to cast a ballot. While the electoral commissions, with varying degrees of independence,"
are responsible for the preparation of elections, including the registration of voters in countries
such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, voter registration in the USA and the UK is
administered and updated by Government departments (Chloe & Darnolf, 1999; Pastor, 1999).
In fact, only 14% of the advanced democracies have Independent Electoral Commissions. This
percentage is much higher in developing democracies, however. Elections in 70% of the Latin
American countries are conducted by Independent Electoral Commissions, 54% of Asia and the
Pacific, 50% of Sub-Saharan Africa," and 71% of Eastern and Central Europe (Pastor,
1999:12).
In as much as voter registration helps to curb the casting of votes by illegitimate voters, it
remains uncertain how it would affect the South African voter turnout. In March 1995 Brians
conducted a study in Canada regarding the effect of voter registration on voter turnout in relation
to residential mobility. In his findings he concluded that voter registration reduces voter turnout
on mobile residents in Canada (Brians, 1996:215-225). Even in America, the element of social
mobility tends to affect voter turnout rather negatively (Squire et al., 1987). This trend may also
be relevant for South Africa since voters are allowed to vote only in their own areas of
residence. They may not vote somewhere else without making special arrangements, which may
be burdensome and perhaps a disincentive for voting in certain instances. The same strictures
may apply to residents who are abroad during the time of voter registration so that even when
they arrive in the country on election day they may not be able to vote since their names may not
be on the voters' roll. Unless the electoral provisions cater for mobile voters,ll this could indicate
a negative correlation between voter registration and residential mobility even in South Africa.
Perhaps this study will shed some more light in this area.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has taken the introduction of the policy of voter registration further by attempting
to describe the constitutional and legislative background up to and after the first democratic
elections of 1994. From this background it can be concluded that the South African electoral
9
10
11
According to Pastor (1999: 15), "... The absence of an independent electoral commission (EC) is likely to lead
to 'flawed' elections, ... the EC must also be perceived as independent. The 1983 Nigerian elections failed
because the opposition parties believed that the EC was controlled by the incumbent. The 1992 election in
Angolafailedfor a similar reason".
Including South Africa.
Referring to citizens on mobile homes in Canada, who keep shifting areas of residence and hence, voting
districts. The concept extends to travelling and other citizens who often change voting districts, who may need
to keep registering in different voting districts in order to vote, according to Brains (1996). Also see Pecquet
(1985) on the "Effects of Voter Mobility on Agenda Setting".
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system prior to 1994 was designed under circumstances where universal adult suffrage was new
to the country. In the same period South Africans were in possession of different forms of
identification documents as a result of past political practices. Along with these conditions, there
was no previous all-inclusive and democratic election from which lessons could be learnt. Due
to these limitations in experience, the electoral system after the 1994 elections needed further
development in order to minimise electoral fraud. It can be seen that the absence of a voters' roll
in the Electoral Act of 1993 was one of the weaknesses of the electoral rules that governed the
1994 elections. This chapter has described constitutional amendments from the Interim
Constitution of 1993 to the final Constitution of 1996. In addition, the new legislative provisions
in the form of Electoral Act no 73 of 1998 have been described as they apply to the formulation
of the Policy of Voter Registration in South Africa. To proceed, the following chapter describes
the decision making process of the policy of voter registration and the provision of the use of a
barcoded ID only for registration and voting purposes. In so doing, the chapter looks at the
parliamentary debates leading to the Electoral Act as well as the actual provisions of the policy
of voter registration.
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CHAPTER3
DECISION FOR VOTER REGISTRATION
1. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter described the constitutional and legislative background to the policy of
voter registration in South Africa. According to this background, the policy of voter registration
does not signify a change, but an improvement of the already existing electoral system by new
provisions designed to eliminate any possibility of electoral fraud (Interview: Lockey, 9
December 1999; The Electoral Steering Committee report, 1996). This chapter focuses on the
policy-making process of the policy, and the decision to use barcoded identity documents as
mentioned in the previous chapter. To this effect, this chapter will look at the questions of "how,
and why was the decision for the policy of voter registration made", in much greater detail. In so
doing, the following points will constitute the structure:
(1) Why Voter Registration In South Africa; (2) Formulation of Electoral Act no 73 of 1998; (3)
Parliamentary Debates; (4) Arguments Against The Legislation; Voter Registration & the
Court Cases; and (5) Requirements & Procedures for Registration.
2. WHY VOTER REGISTRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
After different political parties had lodged allegations of electoral fraud with the lEC at the end
of the 1994 elections (see the lEC election reports, 1994), the lEC and the government decided
to update and enhance the electoral rules and regulations before the 1999 elections (Interview,
Russon, 14 July 1999). The above allegations included complaints concerning: voting by non-
citizens, and multiple voting. In addition, allegations were also made that voters were being
transported by certain political parties to vote in regions in which they did not reside. Although
these allegations could not be substantiated, the Commission and the Government realised that
the electoral rules and procedures needed updating if electoral fraud was to be minimised in
future elections (Electoral Steering Committee Report, 1996; Lodge et al., in EISA, 1998(1)).
As a result, the deputy president, Thabo Mbheki, in consultation with the ministers of Home
Affairs, and of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, initiated the establishment of
the Electoral Steering Committee in 1996 to make recommendations for the updating of the
electoral system (Electoral Steering Committee Report, 1996). The Steering Committee,
comprising the IEC and the Local Governments Electoral Task Group (TEG), had to develop
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electoral options to be evaluated by the Electoral Commission. The Steering Committee
suggested:
• The delimitation of regions through the Geographic Information Systems (GIS);
The introduction of a voters' roll and the registration of voters; and
The formulation of a new Electoral Act to create uniformity for elections at all tiers, and to
make provisions for the use of the voters' roll. The act had to be completed by June 1998 to
allow time for the preparations for the 1999 elections (The Electoral Steering Committee
report, 1996).12
•
•
In addition, having received public complaints regarding false claims on welfare serices,
allegedly even by non-citizens.l'' who used false documents to obtain pensions and other kinds
of welfare grants, the ANC-led Government believed that a single and uniform means of
identification for all citizens was necessary to eliminate ID related fraud. As a result, on 20
August 1998 the ANC announced that its National Executive had decided that only barcoded
and temporary ID's could be used for general elections (Lodge, et al., in EISA, 1998( 1)). This
decision by the ANC was strongly opposed by both the New National Party (NNP) and the
Democratic Party (DP). The opposing argument was that South Africans without barcoded ID's
would be disenfranchised (Hansard no 18, 1998:6574/5). In the same light, the IEC chief, Judge
Kriegler indicated that it would be "unrealistic and unfair to insist on the sole use of barcoded
ID documents,,14 (The Star, 21 August 1998). The issue of barcoded ID's became the point of
contention in Parliamentary debates during September 1998 concerning the Electoral Bill.
3. FORMULATION OF THE ELECTORAL ACT NO. 73 OF 1998
As indicated in section 2 above, the Electoral Act (no 73 of 1998) owes its origin to the
recommendations of the Electoral Steering Committee of 1996, the Electoral Bill (B90-96) of
1996, and the Aliens Control Amendment Act no 76 of 1995 (Electoral Steering Committee
Report, 1996; Interview: Lockey, 9 December 1999). The Electoral Bill (B90-96) of 1996 was
drafted and introduced by the Ministry of Home Affairs to the National Assembly to amend
Electoral Act (no 202 of 1993), so as to accord with the new Constitution of 1996. The bill,
12 The report adds that: " ... Before then, an Electoral Amendment Bill (B90-96) should be a stopgap measure
until the new Act could be established". In fact, the Electoral Act no 73 of 1998 appears to be a replication of
this bill. Both the bill (B90-96) and the Electoral Act of 1998, particularly the provisions for barcoded !D's,
were largely informed by the provisions of the Aliens Control Act no 76 of 1995 which promulgated the
stringent controls of immigration rules, permits, passports and identification documents (Interview: Lockey, 9
December 1999).
See footnote 12 above.
According to Russon (Interview: 14 July 1999) this was Kriegler's personal view, not the official stance of the
IEC.
13
14
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according to the Electoral Steering Committee Report (1996), was the foundation on which the
Electoral Act had to be built prior to the 1999 elections. The Electoral Act no 202 of 1993 had
passed through many consultation stages within policy making circles until it was replaced by
Electoral Act no 73 of 1998 (Interview: Lockey, 1999). One of these stages includes the
drafting, and later, the presentation of the Electoral Bill (B69-98) by the Minister of Home
Affairs to the National Assembly on 13 July 1998. On 22 July 1998, the Bill was referred to the
Home Affairs Portfolio Committee in order to invite public comment. At the same time this
Committee conferred with the Portfolio Committee on Constitutional Affairs (Home Affairs
Portfolio Committee minutes, 1996-1998). Since in the past this legislation had largely been
handled by the Department of Home Affairs, the Department continued to keep encouraging the
public to acquire barcoded ID's far in advance of elections, in case such documents should be
required for voting purposes in the 1999 elections (Interview: Lockey, 9 December 1999).
The following section discusses the formulation of Electoral Act no 73 of 1998, starting from
the Parliamentary debates on the Electoral Bill (B69-98) until the promulgation of the Act.
3.1 Parliamentary debates
In a parliamentary debate on 17 September 1998, Desmond Lockey of the ANC indicated that
the Electoral Bill (which became Electoral Act no 73 of 1998) was necessary to attain a
legitimate election. According to Lockey, the bill was to provide for the use of a single form of
identity document for all citizens. The Electoral Bill, according to Lockey, restricted the
registration of voters to only those citizens in possession of barcoded ID's as required by the
Identification Act of 1986. The Electoral Bill according to this view, was to make the elections
more legitimate. In his argument, Lockey indicated that a legitimate election is "An election
with a Uniform and verifiable ID for all our citizens" (Hansard no 18, 1998:6569). He argued
that other types of identity documents were open to many types of fraud. Lockey indicated that:
"There are many duplicates of these other non-coded ID's in circulation. Some of these
duplicates are not verifiable against the population register, and I refer here, in particular to the
ID's that were issued in the former TBVC states. This poses a clear risk to the electoral process,
because it can allow citizens to vote more than once in the election" (Hansard no 18,
1998:6569).
In the same debate, Abrahams of the IFP indicated that the requirement of a barcoded identity
document for purposes of voting was an important priority for his party with reference to the
Bill. He added that the IFP supported this provision on the basis that it would maintain
consistency and uniformity in the electoral process. He then urged all parties to encourage their
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supporters who did not possess barcoded identity documents to apply for them so that they
would be able to register for voting (Hansard no 18, 1998:6574/5).
In the same debate, Botha of the Freedom Front indicated support for the decision for barcoded
identity documents as proposed by the Bill. He stated that: "... we will support any measure
which will bring law and order, discipline and First World standards back to South Africa. We
will also support any attempt to eliminate crime, corruption, fraud and other irregularities"
(Hansard no 18, 1998: 6576). Botha added that South Africa could not afford the chaos of the
1994 election again. He argued that the Bill and its amendments were aimed at making the 1999
election a credible, fair and impartial election in which every citizen would and could cast his or
her vote for the party of their choice. Botha indicated that the Freedom Front was not certain of
the capacity of the Department of Home Affairs to issue the required number of barcoded
identity documents within a limited space of time. Having been assured by the Director General
of Home Affairs of the Department's capacity to issue the required number of ID's, Botha
indicated that: "... because we realise what role a barcoded identity document can play in the
elimination of fraud, we support this provision and will take the Department's word for it at this
stage that they will be able to meet the demand for the documents concerned" (Hansard no 18,
1998: 6577).
De Lille of the Pan Africanist Congress also indicated support for the Bill by her party. She
indicated that she had some knowledge of the offices of the Department of Home Affairs. De
LiIle indicated that, according to her observations of the operations in these offices, there was no
doubt that the Department was more than capable of meeting the deadlines. De Lille urged other
members of the House to make their own observations. She had found that there were already 32
850 barcoded ID documents that had not been collected by the public in the offices of the
Department of Home Affairs. She argued that the Department should not be blamed if people
were not making applications. She then mentioned that: "We must really urge our members and
our supporters to apply for new ID books. All political parties have the responsibility. What
more can Home Affairs do? They cannot go and pull people from their homes and tell them to
come and apply for an ID" (De Lille, in Hansard nol8, 1998: 6579). De Line added that the
Department of Home Affairs could only process ID's once people applied. In response, the NNP
representative, Bester indicated that the NNP opposed the Bill on the basis that it
disenfranchised those voters who were not in possession of the barcoded identity documents
(Hansard no 18, 1998 :6579).
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Mr Green of the ACDP also welcomed and accepted the Bill as amended. The Electoral Bill
was then agreed to, incorporating the decision for barcoded ID's, with the Democratic Party and
the New National Party dissenting as will be discussed in greater detail below.
3.2 Arguments against the Electoral Bill
Although most parties accepted the Electoral Bill with its provisions for barcoded ID's, both the
NNP and the DP remained opposed to the ID provision. In the parliamentary debate, Bester
indicated that the NNP approved the Bill in so far as it improved existing legislation but opposed
the requirement for barcoded ID's in terms of its limitation on voting. The NNP, according to
Bester, opposed the requirement for barcoded ID's for the following reasons:
(a) The provision disenfranchises the voters on the basis of not having a specific type of South
African identity document.
(b) That the Department of Home Affairs appeared not to have enough capacity to issue
several millions of barcoded identity documents to the rest of the electorate within the
limited space of time before the elections (Hansard no 18, 1998:6571/2). In response to
this argument, Lekgoro of the ANC reminded the House that the Director General of the
Department of Home Affairs had assured the Portfolio Committee of the Department's
adequate capacity to timeously meet the demand for barcoded identity documents.
According to Lekgoro, suspicion regarding the capacity of Home Affairs should fall away
after this assurance. Lekgoro further argued that the use of barcoded identity documents
was the only foolproof method that could be employed to ensure that only South African
citizens whose particulars were captured in the population register could vote. He added
that any other procedure would open the electoral process to fraud such as persons voting
more than once, and non-citizens voting. Above all, other methods could contaminate the
voters' roll (Hansard no 18, 1998:6572/3).
(c) The NNP and the OP alleged that the ANC insisted on barcoded ID's because the majority
of its supporters already had barcoded ID's while the majority of their supporters did not
(http://\vww.hsrc.ac.za/co!]")orate/media/1999/mar02 3.html.).15 Both parties felt that the
exclusion of voters would benefit the ANC at the expense of the NNP and the DP. The two
parties regarded this possible exclusion as unconstitutional since it infringed on the
individual political right to vote. In an attempt to protest against the Electoral Bill, the
NNP and the DP threatened to take legal action against the IEC and the Government. The
15 The survey indicates 62% of the registered population as supporting the ANC, 8% supporting the NNP, 6%
supporting the DP, 4% the IFP, 3% the UDM, and 1% each, for other parties.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
26
arguments of each dissenting political party in the several court cases are discussed in
section 4 below (Sunday Times, 6 December 1998).16
4. VOTER REGISTRATION AND THE COURT CASES
As the Electoral Act was passed with the NNP and the DP dissenting, these parties decided to
challenge the voter registration provision in the High Court, and eventually in the Constitutional
Court. The court cases are discussed in this section.
4.1 The NNP of South Africa vs. Govt of the RSA & Others -1999(4) BCLR 457 (C), High
Court, Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division, Case no 16880/98, Judgement Date:
26/02/1999.
4.1.1 Introduction
During January 1999 the NNP launched an application to the Cape of Good Hope Division of
the High Court. The party was contesting the decision by the Government of the Republic of
South Africa and the Independent Electoral Commission that the citizens of South Africa should
have to possess the barcoded green identity document only in order to register for voting in the
1999 general elections.
4.1.2 The Parties to the Case
• Applicant: The New National Party of South Africa
• Respondents: The Government of RSA as the first respondent; The Minister of Home
Affairs, Ministry Head as a second respondent; The Minister of Finance and head of the
Department of State Expenditure as a third respondent; Chairperson of the IEC as fourth
respondent; and the Chief Electoral officer of the IEC as a fifth respondent.
4.1.3 Reliefsought or required by the NNP
• The NNP was seeking a Court order against the provisions of section 1(xii) of Electoral Act
73 of 1998. The contested section relates to the definition of an identity document when read
with sections 6(2) and 38(2) of the same Act. This definition recognises only a green
barcoded identity document for voter registration and voting purposes in South Africa. The
NNP wanted the Court to order the provisions as unconstitutional and invalid since they
excluded from voting eligible voters who were on the population register.
16 This argument was confirmed by one of the DP legal representatives to the court cases, Mrs Santosh Kalyan,
when interviewed by the author in Parliament in September 1999.
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• Further, the NNP was seeking a Court order against the conduct of the Ministers of Home
Affairs and of Finance, as allegedly infringing upon the independence and impartiality of the
lEC, to be declared as invalid and unconstitutional. The alleged conduct of the Ministers was
as follows:
(a) Financial constraints placed by the Minister of Finance on the lEC;
(b) Thereby interfering with the powers of the lEC to carry out its duties and functions as
described in sections 5 and 12 of the Electoral Commission Act and sections 4,5 and 14 of
the Electoral Act as well as sections 181 and 190 of the Constitution. These sections
basically prescribe the main duties of the lEC to organise and administer the free and fair
elections in an unbiased manner. The NNP felt that financial constraints limited the
capacity of the lEC to carry out such duties;
(c) Withholding of barcoded identity documents issued by the Department of Home Affairs
around the country, without delivering them to persons that applied for them, and without
affording proper notices to such applicants.
The NNP wanted a Court order declaring the above-mentioned conduct as irregular. The Party
gave as reason that the defendants failed to apply their minds properly when making their
decisions. Alternatively, that the decisions were made arbitrarily or as a result of unwarranted
adherence to rigid principles or in order to further an improper purpose. Possibly the defendants
had misconceived the nature of their decision by taking into account irrelevant considerations or
ignoring the relevant ones (NNP vs. Govt of SA and Others, Case no 16880/98, in 1999(4)
BCLR 457(c)).
4.1.4 Supporting Evidence
To back its claims the NNP relied on a lengthy affidavit that had been filed by the previous
chairperson of the lEC, Judge Kriegler, alleging the Government's invasion of the lEC's
independence through financial constraints that had rendered the functioning of the lEC
difficult. The affidavit indicated that the IEC had extensive constitutional powers relating to the
very foundation of the state in terms of enabling the public to elect its representatives. Kriegler
indicated that confidence in the electoral process was necessary if democracy and the new order
were to succeed. For such success to materialise, Kriegler argued that the lEC should be seen to
be politically, administratively and financially free from any interference (NNP vs. Govt of SA
and Others, case no 6880/98, in 1999(4) BCLR 457( c):465). In this affidavit, Kriegler accepted
that as the lEC was publicly funded it was accountable to Parliament. He added that the lEC was
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also functionally dependent on the co-operation of both the executive and the legislative
branches of the government. He argued however that the IEC could not perform its arbitral role
unless it functioned manifestly free of Government control. The affidavit indicated that there had
not been unstinting support from the Government in view of its perception of the IEC's status,
role and function. Kriegler felt that although the President, Deputy President and the Ministers
of Home Affairs and Finance did respect the independence of the IEC in their personal
capacities, the Directors General of the latter departments were reducing the IEC to a line
function of the Department of Home Affairs, through which the Department of State
Expenditure would deal with the IEC indirectly only (Case no 16880/98 in 1999(4) BCLR
457( c):466).
The executive director of the federal council of the NNP, Schoeman, produced further evidence
from a Hansard report, and a large number of media reports professing to reflect public
disapproval of barcoded ID limitation. To prove the incapacity of the Department of Home
Affairs, Schoeman's stronger evidence was the Human Science Research Council (HSRC)'s
countrywide survey that had been requested by the IEC. The survey in question was dated 13
August 1998 and was entitled "The Extent to which Eligible Voters are in possession of South
African Identity documents" Chttp://www.hsrc.ac.za/socdyn/iec/cover.html). The survey results
revealed that one in ten eligible voters did not have any form of identification document during
the time of the survey. More than two thirds of these people were first time voters between 17
and 21 years of age. The evidence indicated that only 86,2% of the public had the green
barcoded ID document. A further 4,4% had green ID's without barcodes; 3,4% with green ID's
of which the type was unknown to them; 4,7% had blue ID's; 0,7% of the respondents had an ID
issued by one of the TBVC states.
According to the same data, less than one per cent of respondents had only a reference book or
another form ofID. Further, between 4,7 and 5,3 million people did not have a green barcoded
identity document during the time of the survey. To a greater extent, according to the survey, the
absence of ID's was manifest among individuals living in rural areas, including the regions of
Umtata, Pietersburg, Pretoria, Pietermaritzburg, East LondonlBisho and Durban. The survey
indicated that one in five people without barcoded ID's had applied for one. Of this number,
32% had been waiting for more than 12 weeks while 21% had been waiting for more than 20
weeks, which indicated a lack of capacity on the part of the department of Home Affairs to cope
with the demand Chttp://www.hsrc.ac.za/socdynliec/iec2execsurnm.html).
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In response to the claim concerning the capacity of the Department of Home Affairs, Mokoena,
the Director General of Home Affairs, denied that Home Affairs was incapable of delivering the
ID's. He disagreed with the findings of the HSRC, indicating that even if the figures were
acceptable, they could not be relied upon as they were constantly changing as more voters
acquired the green barcoded ID's on an ongoing basis. Mokoena argued that although it usually
took about two months for the Department to process an application, the Department had been
able on some occasions to process 18 000 applications a day. He added that the number could be
increased to 25 000 a day or even more should such a need arise. Mokoena indicated that the
Department was processing about 12 000 applications a day, reflecting the number currently
being received by the Department. He gave an assurance that, should there be a sudden influx of
new applications, the Department could use a contingency plan including the use of other State
departments such as the Defence Force, the police services and a wide pool of idle printing
facilities in the former TBVC States. According to Mokoena, persons appearing on the
population register, and who applied for a barcoded identity document, could be given a
temporary identification certificate to enable them to register and to vote, pending the procession
of applications (NNP vs. Govt of SA and Others, case no 16880/98, in BCLR 457(c), 1999(4)).
On the issue of identity documents not being received by applicants, Mokoena indicated that
there had been problems with the postal communication. Documents had gone astray or fallen
into the wrong hands. In most cases applicants changed their residential addresses without
notifying the Department, or in most cases, they just failed to collect their identification
documents when they had indicated their wish to do so. Regarding persons who had not yet
applied, Mokoena felt that the responsibility rested with individuals who wished to exercise their
voting right to apply in time for their ID's. On budgetary constraints, he indicated that the NNP
had not challenged the relevant provisions of the Appropriation Act nor taken account of
budgetary and fiscal discipline (NNP vs. Govt of SA and Others, case no 16880/98 in BCLR
457 (c), 1999(4)). On the same point Schoeman argued that the IEC had not been able to appoint
new staff or to pay staff already appointed, for purposes of the registration of voters. Mr
Schoeman further alleged that the Government, especially the office of the Deputy President
Thabo Mbeki, had simply usurped the functions of the IEC. Mr Schoeman felt that this was
synonymous with the take-over of the IEC functions by the ANC (NNP vs. Govt of SA and
Others, case no 16880/98 in BCLR 457(c), 1999(4):463).
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Taking into account the costs incurred during the 1994 election, Schoeman felt that the actual
combined costs of the election could amount to R2,6 billion 17 while in contrast, the Department
of State Expenditure had only allocated an amount of R713,5 million for voter registration
during the period of the court case.
The NNP also made reference to an affidavit of the Premier of the Western Cape, G.N. Morkel,
indicating that the Western Cape Provincial Government had offered an amount of R7,6 million
as a contribution to the registration process in the province. The chairperson of the IEC had
apparently welcomed the contribution whilst the Government had rejected it. As a result,
Morkel's affidavit claimed that the Government was making it impossible for the IEC and its
chairperson to carry out their functions (NNP vs. Govt of SA and Others, case no 16880/98 in
BCLR 457(c), 1999(4)).
4.1.5 The Court Ruling
On 26 February 1999 the Cape High Court ruled against the NNP's application. Judge Van Zyl
found the barcoded identity document to be of benefit to the electoral system as it would serve to
eliminate irregularities (NNP vs. Govt of SA and others, case 16880/98 in BCLR 457(c),
1999(4)). On the question of new applications, the judge felt that there was no reason for
certainty that a substantial number of eligible voters without barcoded ID's and who still had not
applied were going to do so before a cut-off date. As the requirement for barcoded ID's had been
published since October 1998, the judge was satisfied that potential voters (had) had more than
enough time to apply for ID's. He further indicated that the Department of Home Affairs had
recently made more effective arrangements to deliver documents and it was no longer the case
that large numbers of documents were accumulating in its offices (NNP vs. Govt of SA and
others, case 16880/98, in BCLR 457(c), 1999(4)).
On the independence of the IEC, the judge agreed that financial constraints did add pressure to
the functioning of the IEC. The judge indicated however, that Judge Kriegler had given the
assuranc-e, on numerous occasions, that the independence of the IEC had not been affected and
regarded the issue as now academic. Both Judge President King and Deputy Judge President
Hlophe supported these arguments and the Court judged against the NNP. The NNP was not
satisfied with the judgement, deeming it to be short-sighted regarding the constitutional voting
right of all citizens (Interview: Gaum, 15 Decmber 1999). As a result, the Party lodged an appeal
with the Constitutional Court in Pretoria (NNP vs. Govt of SA and others, case 16880/98 in
BCLR 457 (c), 1999(4)).
17 Without giving a breakdown of this figure, Schoeman indicated that electoral costs had increased since 1994
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4.2 The New National Party of South Africa vs. Government of the RSA and Others,
Constitutional Court, Judgement Date 13/04/1999, Case no CCT9/99, In 1999(5)
BCLR 489(cc)
The hearing of the NNP appeal in the Constitutional Court opened on 15 March 1999. The NNP
presented the same argument as it had in the Cape High Court. Counsel Le Roux of the NNP
explained to the judges that the HSRC survey was evidence that 10% of the eligible voters from
the former TBVC states, who did not appear in the population register, also did not have identity
documents. He added that a substantial backlog of unprocessed applications remained at the
office of the Department of Home Affairs. Le Roux argued that the reduction of the IEC into a
line function of the Department of Home Affairs effectively robbed the Commission of its
Independence (Business Day, 16 March 1999; The Citizen, 17 March 1999).
In response, Advocate Semenya of the Department of Home Affairs argued that since no one
who had applied for an ID had been denied, no rights had been infringed (The Star, 17 March
1999). The debate around the independence of the IEC continued for two days, after which, the
Court still had to study all the documentation before it could arrive at a judgement. The Court
only made the judgement on 13 April 1999(NNP of SA vs. Govt of RSA and others, case no
CCT9/99, in BCLR 489( cc), 1999(5), sections 25-27).
4.2.1 The Constitutional Court Judgement
The Constitutional Court ruling was no different from that of the High Court. The former Court
ruled that barcoded ID's had advantages over older documents for three reasons. Firs!ly, a
barcoded ID identified the holder's details quickly. Secondly, the fact that barcoded ID holders
had their fingerprints taken could help prevent electoral fraud. Thirdly, old ID's had been issued
on a racial basis (NNP of SA vs. Govt of RSA and others, Case no CCT9/99, in BCLR 489( cc),
1999(5), sections 23-27; Sowetan, 14 April 1999). The Constitutional Court also made the
following points in the judgement:
• On the Capacity of the Department of Home Affairs
On this issue, the Court indicated that the capacity or incapacity of the Department was only an
issue of implementation and had no relevance to the constitutionality of the provision. In
addition, the number of possible consequences of the statutory measure was limitless; it could
include the unwillingness by some people to register at all, or even as the NNP argued, the
inefficiency of the Department of Home Affairs. All these related to implementation rather than
owing to the introduction of the voters' roll.
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to the consequences of the statutory provision itself. As the Court could not find any probability
that potential voters who really wanted to register could not do so, the appeal in this issue was
dismissed (NNP of SA vs. Govt of RSA & others, case no CCT9/99, in BCLR 489( cc), 1999(5)
Section 44).
• On Insufficient time to apply for ID's and to Register
The majority of judges indicated some concern that the prescribing legislation had only been
passed in October 1998. The judges felt however, that since the requirement for barcoded ID's
had been publicised from April 1998 and by July 1998 about 80% of the population possessed
barcoded identity documents, everyone who would have wanted a barcoded ID had had more
than six months to apply for one. According to the judges, those who had wanted to exercise
their right to vote had had sufficient time to apply for a new identity document and to register to
vote. Further, Parliament was obliged to provide for a reasonable scheme capable of ensuring
that all persons who wanted to vote, and had taken reasonable steps in pursuit of that right, were
able to do so. According to the judges, Parliament had done this. The onus to prove otherwise
rested with the applicant, who, according to the judges, had not managed to give such proof
(NNP of SA vs. Govt of RSA & others, Case no CCT9/99, in BCLR 489( cc), 1999(5) Sections
39-42).
• On the Independence of the lEe
Regarding inadequate funding, said to be infringing on the independence and impartiality of the
lEC, the claim of infringement was dismissed on the basis of previous evidence by Judge
Kriegler that the Commission had agreed on this arrangement. The Judges added that, provided
the lEC could exercise control over registrations, its independence was not being infringed.
Judge Langa indicated that the legislation, in fact, had to be legislated by Parliament and not by
the lEC. The fact that the provisions ultimately adopted ran against the recommendations of the
Commission did not reduce the independence of the lEC. Judge Chaskelson expressed his
interpretation of independence in this case as meaning the absence of a "Political Head" which
was still the case with the lEC (NNP vs. Govt. of RSA and others, case no CCT9/99 in BCLR
489(cc), 1999(5)). The majority of judges indicated that while the relevant organs of the
government might have misconstrued the true nature of their constitutional obligations, there
was no evidence that their activities had infringed on the purpose and functions of the lEC (NNP
vs. Govt ofRSA and others, case no CCT9/99, in BCLR 489(cc), 1999(5) Sections G-H).
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4.2.2 Constitutional Court Judgement
Based on the above arguments, the majority of judges concluded that the statutory provisions for
barcoded identity documents were not unconstitutional and therefore dismissed the NNP's
appeal. On passing the judgement, Judge Hlophe indicated that the Government was no angel in
this case. The electoral legislation had been passed very late to give sufficient time for the lEC
to prepare for the elections. Hlophe added that the government had not done its utmost to
support the IEC, and as a result, the court would not rule for costs in its judgement. The only
dissenting Judge to this ruling was Judge O'Regan. She argued in favour of the applicant on the
basis that the State was obliged to pass legislation that served to enhance enfranchisement rather
than disenfranchisement. Judge O'Regan added that it was unreasonable for Parliament to accept
only barcoded ID's for voting while other forms of ID's continued to be valid for all other
purposes. She further argued that, as a new form of identification document that would replace
all other forms of documents in future, including the green barcoded ID's, was already in the
formulation process, the provisions of the Electoral Act were unreasonable (NNP of SA vs. Govt
ofRSA and others, case no CCT9/99 in BCLR 489(cc), 1999(5) Sections 51-52). The NNP was
still dissatisfied with the judgement. The Party believed that the individual constitutional right to
vote should not be infringed under any circumstances, but having exhausted the channels at its
immediate disposal, and in the interest of the progress of elections, the Party accepted the ruling
of the Constitutional Court (Interviews: Gaum, 15 December 1999; Vorster, 23 November
1999).
4.3 Democratic Party vs. Minister of Home Affairs and Another
The New National Party (NNP) was not alone in dissenting to the Electoral Act and the
provision for barcoded ID's. As the NNP received its unfavourable judgement against its
applications in the Cape High Court, the DP went ahead with its application in the Transvaal
Division of the High Court against the barcoded ID stipulation on 3 March 1999.
4.3.1 The Arguments by the DP
The DP and the NNP had similar arguments against the constitutionality of the decision for
barcoded ID's by the government, both in the High Courts and in the Constitutional Court. In
addition to the NNP's arguments, the lawyers of the DP were determined to challenge the
validity of the evidence submitted in the NNP case by the Director General of Home Affairs that
people could use temporary registration certificates for voting. The DP also argued that barcoded
identity documents could not prevent fraud more successfully than other ID's could.
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The main reason why the Democratic Party challenged the barcoded ID stipulation, according to
its spokesperson on Court cases, Kalyan (Interview: 8 September 1999), was that the party
would be disadvantaged by the stipulation. Kalyan explained that the majority of the population
that was mobilised to obtain new ID's in preparation for the first democratic elections in 1994
represented people who had old passbooks or reference books or no ID's at all. This majority, a
large proportion of whom were the followers of the ANC, were encouraged to apply for new
ID's before the 1994 elections and were presently in possession of barcoded ID's. She added that
the DP and NNP supporters had not bothered to apply for new barcoded ID's at that stage since
they already possessed some form of what they considered to be adequate identification, which
would be acceptable for voting in 1994. Kalyan further indicated that as a larger section of the
latter parties' supporters did not have these documents, these parties would most likely be
disadvantaged by the stipulation, to the advantage of the ANC. The parties felt that the playing
ground was therefore not level and decided to challenge the decision in the High Court and the
Constitutional Court. The case was postponed from 3 March until 12 March 1999 (The Citizen, 4
March 1999).
4.3.2 Judgement of the Transvaal High Court Division
Due to the similarity of circumstances between the NNP and the DP, the Judgement of this
Court was similar to that of the Cape High Court on the NNP case in February. As a result, the
DP lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court against this judgement (EISA, 1999(9):2).
4.4 Democratic Party vs. Minister of Home Affairs and Another
The case of the DP vs. the Minister of Home Affairs and Another is discussed in the following
section.
4.4.1 The Judgement
The Constitutional Court Case no CCT11/99, Judgement Date: 13/04/1999, in 1999(6) BCLR
607(cc)
The DP, like the NNP, appealed to the Constitutional Court against the decision of the Transvaal
High Court. Due to the similarity of facts, arguments and circumstances, the hearing on these
two cases was conducted in the same venue, on the same day and by the same panel of judges.
The new issues raised in the DP case, which were not considered in the NNP case were:
(a) The equality argument, and
(b) The application for referral for evidence.
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On the equality argument, the DP representative, Loxton, indicated that both the surveys of the
HSRC and Opinion 1999 indicated that significant numbers of South Africans were without
barcoded ID's. Loxton then argued that the challenged provisions constituted an indirect
discrimination against discrete vulnerable groups on the grounds of race, age, residence, belief,
conscience or political affiliation. This submission was based on the HSRC survey findings that
a greater proportion of white potential voters, rural potential voters, and younger potential voters
had no green barcoded identity documents (Democratic Party vs. Minister of Home Affairs and
Another, case no CCT11199, in BCLR 607(cc), 1999(6) sections 11-12).
Furthermore, Loxton argued that the discrimination was on one or more of the grounds
contained in section 9(3) of the Constitution. This section prohibits the State from unfairly
discriminating directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race,
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age,
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. In his judgement, Judge
Goldstone pointed out that there was no evidence to indicate the actual impact of the Electoral
Act on the said categories of people. Where such impact may be presumed, there was no further
evidence that the Electoral Act, and no other factor, had caused such an impact nor how much of
that impact. As a result it could not be established whether such unknown impact, if any, in fact
constituted unfair discrimination. On section 12(a) the judge indicated that there was no
evidence to suggest that the persons in the identified categories had registered in smaller
numbers than other categories. From this analysis the judge dismissed the argument of the DP
(Democratic Party vs. Minister of Home Affairs and Another case no CCTl1/99, in BCLR
607(cc),1999(6».
On the referral for evidence, the DP argued that the Court had made a mistake in not referring
the application for the hearing of oral evidence on the number of both registered and
unregistered voters. This information, according to the DP representatives, was necessary for the
evaluation of the capacity of the Department of Home Affairs. In its judgement the Court
referred to the evidence given by the Director General of Home Affairs, Mokoena, in the NNP
case. The Court found that there was no reason to doubt Mokoena's assurance of the capacity of
the Department in issuing barcoded identity documents (Democratic Party vs. Minister of Home
Affairs and Another case no CCTll/99, in 1999(6) BCLR 607(cc), sections 13 & 18). Judge
Yacoob found that the provisions of the Electoral Act did not infringe on any rights. The onus to
prove that certain rights had been infringed rested upon the Democratic Party, which had not
succeeded in giving such proof in the opinion of the Court. Due to the concerns of the court
regarding the lateness of the legislation, and that the government had not done its utmost to
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support the functioning of the IEC, the Court dismissed the appeal without any ruling for costs
(Democratic Party vs. Minister of Home Affairs and Another, Case no CCTll/99, in BCLR
607(cc), 1999(6), sections 18 & 19).
4.5 The South African Prisoners' Union: August and Another vs. Electoral Commission
and Others, Case no CCT8/99, Judgement date: 01104/1999 in 1999(4) BCLR
363(cc».
Two prisoners, August and Another(name not specified), supported by the Prisoners Union and
the South African Prisoners Organisation for Human Rights (Sapohr) applied to the High Court
and the Constitutional Court regarding the disenfranchisement of prisoners. The cases are
discussed in the following section.
4.5.1 Introduction
For a citizen to vote in the 1999 general elections he or she should be in possession of a green
barcoded identity document, as well as fall within the legally enfranchised category of South
African citizens. According to the IEC Chief Director of voter registrations, Russon, (Press
statement, 7 March 1999), the Electoral Act no 73 of 1998 disqualifies convicted prisoners or
those awaiting trial from voting. Other restricted categories include permanent residents who are
not citizens; South Africans abroad on a permanent basis; and all citizens without barcoded
identity documents.
Unlike the NNP and the DP, the Prisoners Union did not contest the barcoded identity document
stipulation. Instead, it set out to challenge the disqualification of prisoners from voting. The
prisoners regarded the disenfranchisement of themselves as unconstitutional and challenged it in
the Transvaal Division of the High Court. The Union was approaching the Court in the hope that
it would declare the stipulation of the disenfranchisement of prisoners as unconstitutional.
4.5.2 Arguments by the Prisoners' Representatives'"
The applicants argued that the Interim Constitution provided for universal adult suffrage and did
not expressly disqualify any prisoner/so It did however, propose that the disqualification be
prescribed by law. In the case of prisoners, section 16(d) of the Electoral Act of 1993 prohibited
voting by people detained in prison after being convicted and sentenced without the option of a
fine in respect of:
(i) "... Murder, robbery with aggravating circumstances and rape; or
18 The applicants, August, a sentenced prisoner, and on unsentenced prisoner were represented by G.C.Marcus
Sc, and J.Kentridge, as instructed by the Legal Resource Centre and supported by the Prisoners Union (Case
no CCT8/99, in BCLR 363(CC), 1999(4)).
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(ii) Any attempt to commit such an offence ..." (Section 16(d), Electoral Act no 202 of 1993).
The Act also referred to persons who are detained as a result of mental health problems.
According to the representatives of the Union, the Electoral Act of 1998 provides that any South
African in possession of an identity document may apply for registration as a voter. As the
Electoral Act does not include any other category of prisoners in a disenfranchised list, the
Union argued that all prisoners outside the above-mentioned categories should be entitled to
vote (Electoral Act no 73 of 1998 which became the Electoral Act no 73 of 1998 and was
published in the Government Gazette no 19351 on 14 October 1998.
4.5.3 Judgement of the High Court
On 12 March 1999 the Transvaal Division of the High Court made its ruling on the case. Judge
Els agreed that incarceration does not deprive prisoners of the right to vote but limits them since
the Electoral Act provides that voters must register in districts in which they are ordinarily
resident. He added that registering prisoners in each cell as a permanent address would be
administratively difficult (Case no CCT8/99, in BCLR 363( cc), 1999(4); Business Day, 15
March 1999). The Court decided that the providing of voting facilities in prisons would pose
insurmountable logistical, financial and administrative difficulties for the IEC. The Court
dismissed the application (EISA, 1999(9):2). The prisoners' representatives (see footnote 18
above) were dissatisfied with the judgement of the High Court and lodged an appeal against it in
the Constitutional Court.
4.6 Constitutional Court: Case no: CCT8/99 in 1999(4) BCLR 363(cc), 01104/99
The following section discusses the ruling of the Constitutional Court on the Prisoners' Union
Appeal case.
4.6.1 The Ruling
On 1 April 1999 the Constitutional Court made its judgement in favour of the Prisoners Union.
The Court ruled that neither the Court itself nor the IEC but only Parliament itself had the right
to disenfranchise prisoners (EISA, 1999(10): 1). The Court found that Parliament had not
indicated such an intention anywhere in the 1996 Constitution (Case no CCT8/99, in BCLR
363(cc), 1999(4): 380). The Court also indicated that more than a third of persons in prisons
were awaiting trial while many of them were incarcerated because they could not afford low
amounts of bailor small fines and were thus not serious offenders. The Court therefore ordered
the IEC to make all necessary arrangements to register all prisoners who were not excluded in
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terms of section 8(2) of the Electoral Act,19 and who had been prisoners between the registration
periods of November 1998 and March 1999. As a result, the lEC had to register more than
146000 pnsoners" in a short space of time prior to the elections (Die Burger: 3 April 1999;
Sowetan: 6 April 1999).
This ruling was not welcomed by the Freedom Front, and the Federal Alliance political parties.
Federal Alliance leader, Luyt, was not satisfied with convicts enjoying and being entitled to the
same rights and privileges as law-abiding citizens (Die Burger: 3 April 1999; The Herald, 5
April 1999). Luyt argued that if the law-abiding citizens were abroad during elections, the lEC,
the Government and the citizens themselves should ensure that there the necessary logistics were
in place to enable them to vote. Viljoen of the Freedom Front also expressed a similar
disappointment with the ruling (Die Burger: 3 April 1999; The Herald, 5 April 1999). Both the
DP and the NNP accused Mr Golden Miles Bhudu, the president of Sapohr, for using his
position in the prisoners organisation to win the prisoners' votes for the UDM. The former two
parties questioned the fairness of the judgement on the grounds that it enfranchised prisoners
who have violated human rights but disenfranchised law-abiding citizens. (Die Burger: 3 April
1999; Sowetan: 6 April 1999). Bhudu of the UDM indicated support for the judgement on the
basis of what he called: "... a mere recognition of, and respect for the supremacy of the
Constitutional Court" (Sowetan: 6 April 1999).
5. SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENS ABROAD
Chapter 2 of Electoral Act (no 73 of 1998) stipulates that registered citizens may vote only at
stations where they have registered. As discussed in the following section, this provision had
complicated implications for South Africans abroad (Cape Argus, 6 April, 1999; Cape Times, 12
April, 4 May 1999; The Star, 6 April 1999).
5.1 Disenfranchisement of South Africans abroad?
One of the objectives of the Electoral Amendment Bill (B90-96) of 1996, and the Electoral Act
no 73 of 1998 was "... to amend the provisions regarding voting stations ... and repeal those
regarding foreign voting stations" (Electoral Bill [B90-96] of 1996, sec 16; Electoral Steering
Committee Report, 1996). This meant that, unlike the 1994 elections, voting would take place
only in South Africa in the 1999 elections. As a result, the voting districts and registration
19 Section 8(2) prohibits the registration of who those have applied fraudulently, are not a South African citizen,
have been declared by the High Court to be of unsound mind or detained for such a condition, or persons not
ordinarily resident in the area for which they intend voting.
IEC Press release by Mr Ray Russon, 7 March 1999, Pretoria, indicated 150000 Prisoners.20
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stations In which citizens could register and vote were designated only in South Africa
(Interview: Gaum, 15 December 1999). The implication was that South Africans in foreign
countries, who wanted to register and vote had to travel back to South Africa to register, and
also return to those voting districts to vote on election day (Cape Times, 4 May 1999; Interview:
Gaum, 15 December 1999). This stipulation, and the absence of reasonable arrangements by the
IEC to enable South African citizens abroad to register and vote made it impossible for them to
do either (Interviews: Gaum, 15 December 1999; Kalyan, 8 September 1999; and Vorster 23
November 1999; Cape Times, 12 April, 4 May 1999; The Star, 6 April 1999). The DP, Federal
Alliance, and the NNP felt that this disenfranchisement was both unfair to the voters, and
unconstitutional. As a result, these parties met on numerous occasions in Pretoria to collaborate
on challenging the IEC and the Government on this issue (Interview: Gaum, 15 December 1999;
The Star, 6 April 1999).
Both the ACDP and the Freedom Front argued that it was unacceptable that convicted prisoners
could vote while law-abiding citizens remain disenfranchised. On the other hand, the DP gave
an ultimatum to the IEC to "permit the enfranchisement of South Africans abroad" or face court
action (Cape Argus, 6 April, 1999; Cape Times, 6 April 1999; The Star, 6 April 1999). In
addition, Tony Leon of the DP wrote to the Chairperson of the IEC requesting that South
Africans who would be representing South Africa in sports activities outside the country on
election day be allowed to vote in the same way as South African ambassadors and diplomats
abroad (Cape Times, 6 April, 1999). The letter made special reference to the South African
cricket team, and other sports people. In response, and to the delight of the DP and the United
Cricket Board, on 12 April 1999 the IEC agreed that registered South Africans, including sports
people travelling abroad could register in South Africa's 88 embassies in foreign countries (Cape
Argus, 15 April 1999; Cape Times, 15 April 1999). To do so, registered voters had to obtain
declaration certificates from the stations in which they were registered, and had to present these
certificates at the various embassies in order to vote (Cape Argus, 15 April 1999; Cape Times,
15 April, 1999, Sowetan, 20 April, 1999). Voting in foreign embassies took place on 26 May
1999 (Cape Times, 27 April, 1999; The Star, 28 April, 1999). In addition, the IEC made
provisions for registered voters who would be unable to be at their voting stations on 2 June to
apply for a special voting status (Sowetan, 20 May 1999; The Sunday Times, 23 May 1999).
Special voters were those who could not get to the voting stations on 2 June due to physical
disability, pregnancy, and those voters in South Africa who wanted to vote away from their
registration stations (Sowetan, 20 May 1999). Special voting took place on 31 May and 1 June
1999 (Sowetan, 20 May 1999; The Sunday Times, 23 May 1999).
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While the DP was pleased with these arrangements by the IEC, the NNP and the Federal
Alliance were far from being satisfied. The two parties wanted all South Africans, not just the
registered ones, to be enfranchised (Business Day, 28 April 1999; Sowetan, 28 April 1999). The
position these parties held was that the IEC, whose rules made it impossible for South Africans
abroad to register, should have made reasonable arrangements for their registration and voting
(Interview: Gaum, 15 December 1999). Both the FA and the NNP were dissatisfied with the
developments by the IEC in this respect and decided to take a joint court action as discussed in
the following section.
5.2 The New National Party of South Africa, (case no 10121/99), the Federal Alliance
(case number 10508/99) vs. The Chairperson of the IEC (I" respondent), the Chief
Electoral Officer of the IEC (2nd respondent), the Minister of Home Affairs (3rd
respondent), and the Government of South Africa (4th respondent).
On 22 April 1999 the Federal Alliance presented its application to the Pretoria High Court for an
order that registered citizens be allowed to vote anywhere, irrespective of where they had
registered. This application was held jointly with that of the NNP, which applied for a court
order to allow South Africans abroad to register and vote on 2 June (Business Day, 22 April; 28
April, 1999). The following section covers the arguments of the two parties, as well as the court
judgement.
• The Arguments of the NNP
The NNP was requesting the court to order the IEC and the Government to allow all South
African citizens abroad to be given a reasonable opportunity to register and to vote (Cape Argus,
27 April, 1999; Business Day, 28 April, 1999). The NNP wanted all eligible South Africans who
had been outside the country between 27 November 1998 and 7 March 1999, and who had failed
to register to be given a reasonable opportunity to register, or alternatively, to be allowed a
special voter status to vote abroad (Business Day, 28 April, 1999). The argument was that the
Chairperson and the Chief Electoral Officer of the IEC were under a duty to facilitate the
registration of eligible citizens by providing necessary facilities for that purpose (Judgement
document, cases 10121/99 and 10508/99,26 April 1999). In failing to do so, the two officers of
the IEC had effectively disenfranchised those voters. In support of this argument, the NNP relied
on the Constitutional Court judgement in the case of August and Mabutho (Prisoners
Organisation) vs. The JEC and Others. In the latter case the Court concluded that the failure by
the IEC to create conditions enabling prisoners to register and to vote, effectively
disenfranchised all prisoners (Judgement document, cases 10121/99 and 10508/99, 26 April
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1999). The NNP argued that the requirement for registration to take place within the Republic of
South Africa was later relaxed to accommodate Government personnel. The implication was that
whatever objections there might have been were nugatory since the structures were already in
place to accommodate all South Africans abroad (Judgement document, cases 10121/99 and
10508/99,26 April 1999). The NNP also required the respondents to pay the costs of the case.
• The Argument of the Court
On the first claim, the Court ruled that the ruling of the Constitutional Court on the prisoners'
case indicated an absolute denial of the prisoners' right to vote, which was not the case in the
present matter in question. In this case, argued the Court, failure to provide registration facilities
beyond the Republic's borders did not constitute an absolute denial of the right to vote. At worst
it could be argued that it constituted a relative or subjective difficulty or inconvenience, and
never an absolute denial of access to registration facilities (Judgement document, cases 10121/99
and 10508/99, 26 April 1999). The judge added that the voters in this case were never prevented
from returning to South Africa, but that they consciously decided not to return. There was no
evidence to suggest that these votes were prevented from returning to South Africa, either by
Government or by the operation of law. The applicant had failed to show in their affidavit that it
was not reasonably possible for any of the persons to have returned to South Africa. In addition,
the applicant had also failed to show that the effect of the regulations were such as to
discriminate against people within, and those outside South Africa. The distinction, according to
the judges, was volitional. There were those voters in the Republic of their own volition, and
those outside the Republic of their own volition. It could not be argued that the Electoral Act
and the Constitution could be interpreted as implying that anyone outside the Republic between
certain dates was ineligible to vote (Judgement document, cases 10121/99 and 10508/99, 26
April 1999).
On the argument for a relaxation of the provision that registration should take place within the
Republic of South Africa to accommodate Government personnel serving in foreign countries,
the court ruled that the argument lost sight of the fact that this was, in actual fact, not a
relaxation but merely an adaptation of the requirement to accommodate those serving in or at
South African missions abroad which are regarded as South African territory (Judgement
document, cases 10121/99 and 10508/99,26 April 1999). According to the judges, it could not
be argued that South Africans on foreign soil could have been accommodated by allowing
registration to take place at various missions abroad since this presupposed that all these South
Africans were within easy reach of an embassy or foreign mission. The argument further
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presupposed that the number and distribution of South African voters abroad was known so that
a viable system for their registration could be easily administered. The applicant, who could not
even prove to the Court that these unknown people whom the applicant purported to represent
were in fact unable to come to South Africa to register and vote, had failed to prove the validity
of these presuppositions (Judgement document, cases 10121/99 and 10508/99,26 April 1999).
• The Federal A lliance(F A) Arguments
The Federal Alliance applied to the Court requesting it to order the IEC and the Government, as
represented by the above-mentioned respondents, to allow registered voters to vote in any voting
station, and not only at the one where they had registered (Judgement document, cases 10121/99
and 10508/99, 26 April 1999). The FA argued that the Government and the IEC (respondents)
were obliged to make necessary arrangements to enable voters who would be absent from their
voting districts to vote elsewhere. Furthermore, the FA argued that section 33(1)(a) was
inconsistent with the Constitution and/or invalid insofar as it precluded persons who could not
vote at their registration stations from applying for a special vote. The FA also argued that
section 33(1)(b) of the Electoral Act was inconsistent with the constitution and/or invalid in that
it empowered the IEC to prescribe other categories of persons who might apply for a special
voting status. Lastly, the FA requested the Court to order the respondents to the case to pay the
costs thereof (Judgement document, cases 10121/99 and 10508/99,26 April 1999).
• The arguments of the Court
Judge Daniels argued that, since the statutory obligation imposed upon voters was to vote in the
voting districts in which they had registered, the applicants could not contend that the
respondents were obliged to make arrangements for any registered voter to vote elsewhere. In
addition, the Act provided for exceptions. Exceptions for special voting were provided for
people who were physically infirm, disabled, pregnant, or absent from the Republic on
Government service or members of the household of such a person. Judge Daniels added that the
Act obliged the respondents to describe circumstances other than those mentioned, in which
special votes might be applied for and allowed. He added that in the exercise of that discretion it
could hardly be suggested that the Commission ought to have extended the right to all and
sundry, irrespective of the reasons which would have rendered the principle or requirement for
voting in a particular district nugatory, something which the Commission was not entitled to do.
Judge Daniels indicated that the FA had not shown that the Commission's extension of
exceptions had been decided upon arbitrarily or capriciously. Finally, the judge stated that it
could not be shown that any voter who took reasonable steps in pursuit of his or her right to vote
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had been discriminated against. Neither could it be shown that persons falling outside the
categories of special voting status had been prevented from voting by the operation of law or
Government intervention. Instead, added the judge, those who fell outside these categories and
did not vote, did so voluntarily (Judgement document, cases 10121/99 and 10508/99,26 April
1999). In view of these arguments, and those of the NNP, the judge made the following joint
judgement:
Judge Daniels concluded that, neither the NNP nor the FA had made out a case for the relief
claimed, and in the result both applications are dismissed without any order for costs.
5.3 Reaction of Political Parties
The Federal Alliance indicated that it was both shocked and disappointed by the decision,
which, according to the Party, would affect many people. The Party spokesperson, Bosman,
indicated that the FA would not be taking the matter further (Cape Argus, 27 April 1999;
Business Day, 28 April 1999). Swanepoel of the NNP indicated that the Party, which reserved
the right to appeal, was not happy with the judgement and called upon the Government and the
lEC to consider walking the extra mile to allow South Africans abroad to vote (Cape Argus, 27
April 1999; Cape Times, 27 April 1999). According the NNP, this was one of the judgements
whose correctness would always be questionable (Interview: Gaum, 15 December 1999).
Lindiwe Sisulu of the ANC, and also the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs indicated that the
issue was discussed in Parliament in the first place, and all parties including the NNP agreed to
the principle. These Parties stood on the other side as though they had nothing to do with the
law. Sisulu added that it was the responsibility of these two Parties, as it was theirs in the ANC,
to explain to the people that, for reasons set out in this case, it could not be afforded to have
people voting abroad (Cape Argus, 27 April 1999; Business Day, 28 April 1999). In addition, a
legal advisor to the Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, asked the Parties to stop using the court as
a vote-catching forum and get on with the business of canvassing votes (Cape Argus, 27 April
1999). The lEC was relieved at the decision and indicated that it was now free to concentrate on
its primary task of ensuring free and fair elections on 2 June 1999.
5.4 Petitions and protests by South African Citizens abroad
Cries for the right of South African citizens in foreign countries to vote abroad were not limited
only to the Federal Alliance and the New National Party only. As highlighted in the following
section, several groups of South Africans abroad engaged into protest marches and the signing
of petitions, protesting against what they regarded as an unfair denial of their constitutional right
to vote (Cape Times, 26 April 1999).
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In London, about 3 500 South Africans gathered outside the South African High Commission at
Trafalgar Square to protest against the denial of their right to register and vote abroad. The
representative of the protesters handed in three petitions, which came from the following groups:
• The Vote South Africa Abroad, with 4 167 signatures (whose petition read "Vote beloved
Country");
• Build South Africa Internet, with about 5 000 signatures; and
• The last petition signed by the members of the crowd.
The petition requested the IEC to allow South African voters abroad to register and to vote in
foreign countries (Cape Argus, 12 April 1999; Cape Times, 26 April 1999). In a separate
incident, former political exiles and anti-apartheid campaigners in the United States indicated
that more than 14000 South Africans in the USA alone voted in the 1994 election (Cape Argus,
12 April 1999). The outraged protesters complained that the ruling constitutionally
disenfranchised thousands of voters simply because of financial considerations involved in
travel costs.
6. REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR VOTER REGISTRATION
The following section discusses both the requirements and procedures for voter registration as
provided by the Electoral Act no 73 of 1998. The Act delimits the conditions of registering and
voting according the following categories:
6.1 Any South African Citizen of 18 years of age or older can register to vote.
Section 19(2) and (3), chapter 2 of the South African Constitution, Act no 108 of 1996 provides
the right to vote to every adult citizen. Electoral Act no 73 of 1998 interprets an adult citizen, for
voting purposes, as a person of 18 years of age and above.
6.2 Citizens in possession of a Barcoded Identity Document.
It became clear in a Parliamentary debate on barcoded ID's that there are several types of ID's in
circulation in South Africa. Mr Lockey of the ANC indicated that there were many types of ID's
which had been issued in the former homelands. Each homeland had its own type of ID
document while the blacks in South Africa prior to 1986 were in possession of reference or
passbooks, and other racial groups had their own forms of ID documents. As a result it was
concluded that a single, uniform method of identification for all South Africans was necessary to
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minimise fraud in future elections (Hansard no 18, 1998:6569). The HSRC survey data on the
forms of ID's circulating in South Africa identified the following types:
(1) Green barcoded identity documents, (2) Green but not barcoded, (3) Blue ID's,
(4) Reference booklPassbook, (5) Transkei ID, (6) Bophuthatswana ID, (7) Venda ID, (8) Ciskei
ID, (9) Other, (10) no ID at all (http://www.hsrc.ac.za/socdynliec/iec2ch2.html).
In a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa, both Electoral Act no 73 of 1998 and the
Identification Bill of 1997 provide for a green barcoded identity document as the only valid ID
for voting purposes in South Africa. This document contains an identity number assigned to
each and every citizen in terms of particulars registered in the population register. The document
includes the date of birth, gender, surname, full forenames, a recent photograph, the citizenship
details and other details as determined by the Minister of Home Affairs in any given case. The
population register on the other hand, includes more details than the identity document
(Identification Bill, B60-97, 1997 :6). In addition to the above, the register includes the place and
country of birth. If a person's country of birth is not South Africa, the date on which citizenship
was obtained and the date of entry into the country, together with the name of the country of
origin are included in the register. The register also includes the fingerprints, marital status,
particulars pertaining to the travelling records, and other details as the Minister of Home Affairs
may so determine to include (Identification Bill, B60-97, 1997:6).
6.3 People should only register and vote in their ordinary areas of residence.
For registration and voting purposes, the nine Provinces of South Africa were further divided
into 15 000 voting districts (Russon, State of the Voters' Roll, 1999). A person should register
only in the district in which he or she intended to vote. Such a district was one in which a person
normally lived. Voting districts were designed to cater for 1 200 voters in rural areas and 3 500
in urban areas (Russon, State of the Voters' Roll, 1999).21
6.4 Persons who have been detained under the Mental Health Act 1973 (Act no 18 of
1973) as well as persons who are declared by the High Court to be of unsound mind
or mentally disordered may not register to vote (The Electoral Act no 73, eh 2).
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has described both the legislative and the constitutional process of the policy of
voter registration. In so doing, the electoral provisions in the Interim Constitution, together with
21 Document by Judge Kriegler, 1 November 1998, EISA, ppl-5 indicates 1 500 voters in rural areas and 3 000
voters in urban areas.
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electoral legislation prior to the 1994 elections have been analysed. In addition, since the
Constitution and the electoral legislation are the building blocks of the electoral provisions in
South Africa, this chapter has focused on amendments of the past electoral provisions,
Constitutional provisions as well as the passing of new legislation. From this chapter it can be
learnt that the chief amendment to the initial electoral provisions has been the passing of
Electoral Act no 73 of 1998 with its green barcoded identity documents qualification. In
addition, political considerations accompanied by legal disputes played a major role in the actual
policy making process.
The policy making process is significant in that it determines the rules and procedures of the
actual elections. According to this chapter, the rules and procedures in turn determine the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the actual elections. The usual aim of the electoral policies is to
produce the rules and guidelines for the preparation and the running of the actual elections in
order to secure a legitimate poll. As indicated in earlier chapters, the policy making process
itself would be of little value if it did not lead to a policy that is both Constitutional, and that
could be successfully implemented. The chapter has highlighted several factors upon which the
successful implementation of the policy of voter registration would depend. Although not all the
factors could be identified, the Parliamentary debates and Court cases indicated that the
implementation of this policy depended, to a large extent, on the possession of a barcoded
identity document by potential voters. Further, it depended on the capacity of the Department of
Home Affairs to issue such documents to the applicants on time. The actual capacity of the lEC,
both in terms of technology, personnel and finance, to mention a few, were all conditions for a
successful implementation of the policy. In its attempt to analyse the actual implementation of
the policy, the following chapter provides a detailed description of the practical conditions of
implementation, from inception to the actual termination of the policy.
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CHAPTER4
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY OF VOTER REGISTRATION
1. INTRODUCTION
The preceding chapter dealt with the policy making process of voter registration. In the analysis
of the court cases, it became clear that the constitutionality of the policy was significant for its
legitimacy (Chloe & Damolf, 1999; Pastor, 1999; Huntington, 1991). According to the same
analysis, it became clear that legitimacy should be accompanied by the realistic implementation
of the policy if its objectives were to be met. The implementation of this policy depends on
several factors (Manin, 1997) which range from public political awareness, willingness to
participate in electoral activities, the capacity of the implementing body to implement the policy,
the time frame for such implementation to take place, as well as a series of other factors. In
critically assessing this process, this chapter undertakes to describe the successes, challenges and
difficulties of the overall implementation of the policy. In so doing, the chapter focuses on the
practical capabilities, rules and procedures of implementation as employed by the IEC.
Particular emphasis is placed on the financial, technological and personnel capacity of the IEC,
as well as the political will of the voters and parties.
The structure of this chapter portrays the actual preparations for registration and the first round
of registrations, according to the sequence of the concepts as employed by the IEC: The Voting
Districts, Personnel requirements, financial requirements, and The "Zip-Zip" Machines.
2. REGISTRATION PREPARATIONS
2.1 The Voting Districts
Preparatory work for registration began m the first half of 1998 when the Geographical
Information System (GIS) was used to divide the country into 15 000 voting districts (Russon,
The State of the Voters' Roll, 1999:2). The GIS process employed satellite linked survey
equipment and an electronic mapping system at a total cost of R60 million (EISA, 1998( 1):8:2).
The Departments of Central Statistics and of Land Affairs played a major role in mapping and
dividing the country into 86 000 enumerator areas. Each of these areas contained between 120
and 150 households (EISA, 1998(1):2). In demarcating the voting districts as part of the
preparation for the Voters' Roll, the IEC considered alleviating the problem of long queues as
experienced during the 1994 elections by decreasing the size of the voting districts in rural areas
to cater for 1 200 as opposed to 3 500 in urban areas (Interview: Russon, 14 July 1999). Long
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queues were more evident in rural areas than in urban areas during the 1994 elections (Electoral
Steering Committee Report, 1996; interview: Russon, 14 July 1999). The state of
underdevelopment, poor transportation systems, shortage of electricity and the general
inadequacy of infrastructure were the main causes of long queues in rural areas during the 1994
elections. (Interview: Russon, 14 July 1999).
2.2 The "Zip-zip" Code-Readers
In order to simplify and speed up the process of voter registration the IEC made provision for
electronic barcode readers Chttp://www.icl.com/news/press/oct98/150ct.htm). To secure an
appropriate supply of this technology the IEC opened a tender to different electronic supplying
companies (Interview: Du Plooy, 13 July 1999). On 15 October 1998, ICL (South Africa)
announced that it had signed a systems and services contract worth nine million British pounds
with the IEC for the supply of 25 000 hand-held barcode scanners. According to ICL, the
contract was secured after a four-way tender, based on ICL's strength in the training programme
for IEC trainers. In addition, ICL won the tender due to its locally developed programmable
barcode scanning unit (PBSU) and its ability to deliver all the required units by the end of
October 1998 (http://www.icl.com/news/press/oct98/150ct98.htm). According to Du Plooy
(interview: 13 July 1999), the tender contract between the IEC and ICL amounted to R112
million as compared to R90 million announced by ICL.
2.3 Staff Requirements
The following section discusses the Issue of the staff required for voter registration, with
accompanying budgetary constraints.
Table 4.1: Voter Registration Personnel Required Per Province
Province RegIV oting Stations Required Personnel
Eastern Cape 2466 12330
Free State 1 233 6165
Gauteng 1 881 9405
KwaZulu-Natal 3 113 15565
Mpumalanga 814 4070
North West 1 261 6305
Northern Cape 376 1 880
Northern Province 1 951 9755
Western Cape 1 331 6655
Totals 14426 72130
Source: (Interview: Russon, R.D., 14 July 1999)22
22 Also see EISA Update 99 no 2, 27 March 1999:2.
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The data in Table 4.1 indicate that the actual number of voting stations required nationally was
14 426. This number is a little less than the 15 000 projected by the lEe at earlier stages.
According to the Chief Electoral Officer of the IEC, Mchunu, registration stations in schools,
churches and community halls would require over 70 000 officials country-wide (The Citizen,
12 November 1998). Table 4.1 indicates that the IEC actually needed a total of 72 130 officials
to work in its voter registration stations country-wide. These employees were to be trained by
800 lEC facilitators at each registration venue during the week preceding registration (EISA
1998(2):1). To put this plan into action the IEC had to rely ort government approval of its
election budget.
2.3.1 Budget Constraints
The total Election budget amounted to R965 million and could not be approved by the
government. Instead, R500 million was granted during July 1998, which frustrated and angered
the IEC chairman, Judge Kriegler. From this frustration, Kriegler indicated to the media that "...
if the IEC continued to be underfunded, he would resign" (Business Day, 13 July 1998). Judge
Kriegler's dissatisfaction prompted the Government to grant another RI00 million early in
November 1998. According to Judge Kriegler, this was still inadequate and the IEC needed a
further R230 million to prepare the new voters' roll. The Department of Finance indicated that
no more funds would be available until the new financial year which began in April 1999 (Mail
& Guardian, 6 November 1998).
2.3.2 The Civil Servants
As a result of underfunding, the IEC could not employ the number of personnel it needed for
voter registration. Instead, the government promised to make available its civil servants to assist
in voter registration. Such civil servants included teachers and principals who expressed
reservations about their availability as registration coincided with examination marking (The
Star, 21 November 1998; Interview: Russon, 14 July 1999). The inability of the IEC to secure its
own registration personnel on time could have been the reason for staff shortages at certain
registration stations during the first round of voter registrations (Interviews: Du Plooy, 13 July
1999; Russon, 14 July 1999).
2.4 Voter Registration Timetable
The IEC had originally planned to register voters over 16 days spread over 3 months. The
budget constraints and personnel constraints compelled it to reduce this period to six days,
namely, 27, 28 and 29 November and 3, 4 and 5 December 1998. The IEC announced on 24
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November that it had divided the registration period between the northern and the southern
provinces. The lEC planned to register potential voters only in the provinces of Gauteng,
Northern Cape, North West, Mpumalanga, and Northern Province during the first three days
(Interview: Russon, 14 July 1999). Registration in the Eastern Cape, Free State, Kwa-Zulu-
Natal, and the Western Cape would take place from 3-5 December (EISA, 1998(2):2). Factors
such as low registration turnout and the Court Case results (eh 3 section 4 of this study) further
compelled the lEC to keep extending registration dates until March 1999. Hence the second and
final rounds of registration during January, February and March 1999 (EISA, 1998(2». The
registration period is therefore divided into the first, second and third phases (Interview: Russon,
14 July 1999).
2.5 Safety and Security provisions for Registration
To address the question of security, the Deputy President instructed the South African National
Defence Force (SANDF) to provide forces to help with security during registration. As a result,
the SANDF announced that over 8 200 troops were set to engage in the process in all provinces.
A total of 2324 military personnel was set to help in the Gauteng Province; 1 965 in
Mpumalanga Province; 1 000 in the Northern Cape; and 2911 in the Northern Province.
Additional soldiers were to help the police with security at registration points during the
registration period (EISA, 1998(3».
2.6 Public Information
In order to provide the necessary information on registration issues, the lEC made use of
pamphlets to inform the public regarding the registration venues. It also opened an information
telephone hotline from 25 November 1998, with 20 operators answering public queries. The
inability of the operators to deal with specific queries about registration venues and telling
callers to wait for a door-to-door pamphlet delivery campaign were some of the public
complaints. Delays of up to 10 minutes were also reported on the first day of the hotline
(Business Day, 25 November 1998; The Star, 25 November 1998).
The Provincial Electoral Officer (PEO) of Gauteng reported having received requests for
postponement of registration from branches of certain political parties at Boksburg and
Khayalami (Business Day, 25 November 1998). Opposition parties in Mpumalanga also made a
similar request where the PEO promised that the incomplete distribution of information leading
to such requests would be addressed before registration. The PEO of Gauteng, in contrast,
indicated on 25 November that the door-to-door delivery of pamphlets was well advanced,
mentioning that the western parts of Johannesburg had received pamphlets, and that smaller
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municipalities like Cullinan had been completed (Business Day, 25 November 1998; The Star,
25 November 1998). Despite this promise, shortages of leaflets in the southern areas of Greater
Johannesburg were reported. Residents in areas such as Randburg also complained of having
received the wrong pamphlets whilst, to the credit of the project, no problems regarding
pamphlet distribution were reported in the northern areas of Gauteng (Business Day, 25
November 1998; The Star, 25 November 1998). The IEC officials continued with awareness
campaigns by touring villages and speaking in churches in most parts of the North West
Province (The Star, 26 November 1998).
3. FIRST ROUNDOF REGISTRATIONS
3.1 Introduction
The first round of registration is divided into two phases. The first phase covers the registration
of the five northern Provinces which were the first to register at the end of November 1998. The
second phase represents the registration of the four southern Provinces that registered at the
beginning of December of the same year. The following section gives a detailed description of
this historical process in chronological order from the first day until the last day of the first
round of registration.
3.2 The five Northern Provinces
Due to the shortage of registration personnel resulting from budget constraints, the IEC decided
to divide the country into a northern and southern region, and to register the two regions in two
phases during the first round of registration (Interview: Russon, 14 July 1999). Voter registration
began on 27, 28 and 29 November 1998 in the five northern Provinces, namely, Gauteng,
Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, Northern Province, and the North West. Several problems were
reported on the first day of registration: confusion was evident in most of the Johannesburg areas
as the people had received either wrong information or no information at all regarding the
registration venues (The Star, 27 November 1998). According to this edition of The Star, most
registration stations opened late while most voters had to be registered manually as the Zip-Zip
Machines were malfunctioning in most Gauteng areas. The Provincial Electoral Officer of
Gauteng also indicated that more than half of the 100 registration stations in Eastern
Johannesburg failed to open due to the unavailability of the civil servants who were expected to
operate them (The Star, 28 November 1998).
One of the significant registration problems on the first three days, according to the IEC
Chairperson Judge Kriegler, was that large numbers of voters turned up at wrong registration
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
52
stations due to inadequate information about registration venues. Another problem was that
many stations had to use manual registration methods due to complications with the Zip-zip
machines while the staffing shortages did not make matters easier. Judge Kriegler indicated that
the system had not worked in many areas. The lEC needed to improve communication with the
civil servants whose morale was low due to lack of clarity on the conditions of their volunteer
work, that is, the travel and subsistence allowances. In an interview with The Star newspaper,
electoral officers cited poor training on the part of volunteer staff as the cause of most problems
during voter registrations (The Star, 30 November 1998). As Table 4.2 indicates below, out of
6276 registration" stations in the first five Provinces, 720 registration stations could not open on
27 November 1998 due to staffing problems. On Sunday 29 November, the last day of
registration, a further 129 voting stations could not open in these Provinces. According to The
Citizen (28 November 1998), voter registration in Soweto had a slow start. Although some
registration stations opened and functioned smoothly in Soweto, other stations had to turn
registration candidates away as a result of shortages of registration equipment and materials. The
same Citizen edition indicates that in Soweto, most problems were experienced in areas such as
Dobsonville and Alexandra. Some people turned back as soon as they heard that equipment was
not working in Jabulani (The Citizen, 28 November 1998).
Serious problems were experienced in the Lowveld region of Mpumalanga where most stations
did not open at all. The electoral officers indicated that the main problem in the Areas of Piet
Retief and Mogoba Districts was the failure by volunteer staff to arrive at the stations (The
Citizen, 28 November 1998). In Kimberley and the lower Orange regions the Defence Force
arrived late and there was no one to staff registration stations (The Citizen, 28 November 1998).
The Chief Director of voter registration (Interview: Russon, 14 July 1999) indicated that a lack
of adequate roads and electricity facilities, staff shortages and the remoteness and longer
distances between centres were the main causes of problems in rural areas during the first round
of registration. According to Russon, adequate or superior road infrastructure in urban areas
made it easier to respond to calls of material shortages between different stations than in the
rural areas. Russon stated that: "What we did was to store more materials in certain central
places so that it would be easier to distribute such materials to nearer centres when there was a
call. The remoteness and the inaccessible road system made it difficult, if not impossible, to do
this in rural areas."
Although difficulties of non-arrival of staff, malfunctioning of the zip-zip machines and the lack
of information regarding registration venues was experienced in areas such as Soshanguve and
23 lEe had previously given a figure of6 283. See EISA Election update 99 no 3, Il Dec 98:2.
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Centurion, to a large extent voter registration in Pretoria and its surroundings went smoothly
(Pretoria News, 27 November 1998). According to this edition, most registration points opened
on time, the queues were not long and there were not too many problems in Mamelodi.
Proceedings started smoothly in the North West Township of Mabopane except that people were
coming in more slowly than expected (The Citizen, 28 November 1998; Pretoria News, 27
November 1998). It is clear according to The Citizen (28 November 1998) that the smooth start
was shortlived as a lack of stationery later caused delays, long queues and confusion in
Mabopane and the surrounding villages. Insignificant problems regarding the use of the scanners
in Atteridgeville were solved as soon as officials were shown how to operate them (The Citizen,
28 November 1998; Sowetan, 27 November 1998). The problems with the Zip-zip machines
included the batteries running low or just not functioning at all (The Citizen, 28 November 1998;
Pretoria News, 27 November 1998). Table 4.2 indicates the number of registration stations per
province that could not open in the northern Provinces during the registration weekend of 27-29
November 1998.
Table 4.2: Registration Stations not Opening on 27-29 November 1998
Provinces Fri 27 November '98 Sunday 29 November '98
Gauteng III 3
Mpumalanga 17 0
Northern Cape 49 0
Northern Province 78 6
North West 485 120
Total 720 129
Source: Business Day, 30 November 1998
According to Table 4.2 the number is higher on the first day, i.e. 720 stations, and decreases to
129 on the final day, Sunday 29 November 1998. According to this table, it appears that the
North West had more problems than the rest of the provinces. On both days it had the highest
number of stations that could not open. Mpumalanga appears to have had the least problems, i.e.
only 17 stations could not open on Friday 27 November, with all stations operating on Sunday
29 November 1998.
The Citizen (28 November 1998) regarded the first day as a "SHAKY START TO
REGISTRATION', and the proceedings of the day at numerous stations were, according to the
lEC's own admission, not perfect to say the least. The IEC spokesperson, Dlamini claimed that
registrations went well overall, and that the IEC had proved its capability to do its job. He
admitted, however, that the lEC's house-to-house pamphlet delivery had been a logistical
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nightmare and the Commission should use more effective publicity methods in the next
registration phase during 3-5 December 1998 (Business Day, 30 November 1998; The Citizen,
28 November 1998). These methods were to include the placing of pamphlets at bus stops,
supermarkets, filling stations and railway stations. The Chairperson of the IEC, Judge Kriegler,
and the Chief Electoral Officer, Mchunu, felt, in general, that registration went relatively well
and that most problems were being ironed out for the next stage of registration (Business Day,
30 November 1998; The Citizen, 28 November 1998).
On Thursday 3 December 1998 the IEC announced that over 3,735 million people had been
registered in the five Northern Provinces (EISA, 1998(3)). The IEC believed that as soon as the
loading of data from manual registrations was complete, this figure would exceed 4 million.
Table 4.3 below indicates that out of the census voting population of 5 512 651 in Gauteng, only
2 101 758 or 38,1% were registered during this round of registration. Out of the census total of
1 685 324 voting population in Mpumalanga, only 679 508 or 40,3% had registered, with 39,7%
in the Northern Cape, 36,4% in the North West and 39,9% in the Northern Province (see Table
4.3 below).
To conclude the description of registration in the northern Provinces it would be interesting to
consider the sentiments of the IEC Chairperson, Judge Kriegler, who considered that, given the
budget and personnel constraints, registration went relatively well and had been educational for
the next phase scheduled for 3-5 December 1998. What makes this sentiment more
understandable is that this had been the country's first experience of voter registration for
general elections. There had not been any local experience to learn from or to use for
companson.
3.3 The Four Southern Provinces
Following the very first registrations in the northern Provinces during November, the first week
of December marked the tum for the southern Provinces (Interview: Russon, 14 July 1999).
Voter registration in the Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, and the Western Cape
Provinces took off on 3 December 1998 (Sowetan, 4 December 1998; The Sunday Times,
6 December 1998). In the same way as in the Northern Provinces, registration in the Southern
Provinces was dominated by a series of difficulties. Heavy rains, staff shortages and inaccessible
roads, particularly in rural areas (Sowetan, 4 December 1998; The Sunday Times, 6 December
1998). A combination of these factors had complicated the registration process on Thursday
3 December 1998, resulting in about 900 registration stations failing to open in all four
Provinces (The Sunday Times, 6 December 1998). According to the Sowetan (4 December
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1998), there were further complaints by the public regarding the lack of information on
registration points in these areas. This, according to the Sowetan, was due to an inadequate
publicity drive by the lEe. In the next section, a description of the registration process per
Province in the southern Provinces will be given.
4. REGISTRATIONS IN KWAZULU-NATAL
The following section discusses registration in KwaZulu-Natal, over the first round of
registration.
Registrations
Table 4.1 above indicates that the province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) required a total of 15 565
personnel to register its 5 440 548 voting population (see Table 4.3 below).
There were heavy rains on the first day of registration in the province. As a result, about 20% of
registration stations could not open due to the non-arrival by the registration staff. The
percentage of stations that opened in the rural areas varied between 40-90% while about 75% of
the stations were fully operational in Durban (EISA, 1998(3)). About the progress of voter
registration in KwaZulu-Natal, the following media reports are worth noting:
• The Daily News, 3 December 1998, It's a Jerky start, Scores of KwaZulu-Natal
registration stations fail to open on time
"... Complaints from the public and party leaders about unmanned registration points and
inaccurate lists poured into the Daily News today and teams of reporters in the field
confirmed this dismal picture... Heavy rains in most parts of KwaZulu-Natal also
hampered the delivery of material to several rural stations in the province ... Roads have
been washed out in some areas, making it difficult for our staff to access the stations. "
• The Citizen, 4 December 1998, Rain, logistics bog down registration
"... In KwaZulu-Natal Midlands it was pouring with rain and only a trickle of people
arrived to register. Rain was also threatening on the KwaZulu-Natal South Coast and
registration points there were quiet. In Durban the process was running smoothly ... "
• The Sunday Tribune, 6 December 1998, Against all odds to do their duty
However, while the frail and elderly waited in long lines eager in some instances to
thumbprint their signatures on the registration forms - thousands of potential voters
among the aged, infirm and disabled this week were ignored when it was found that the
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IEC had made no provision for their special needs during this round of voter registration.
Director of the Councilfor the Aged in KwaZulu-Natal, Pat Naicker, said that the IEC had
not made an effort to accommodate the needs of people with special needs, either at voter
registration points or at their homes. The awareness of the voter registration process has
been poor and thus the poor turnout ...
• The Sunday Tribune, 6 December 1998, Against all odds to do their duty, Frustration
on the South Coast
There was frustration, anger and confusion on the South Coast this week as many rural
people waited in vain to register as voters. According to local councillors 40 of the 320
registration stations in the region did not open because officials did not arrive. In some
instances headmasters were not informed that their schools had been chosen as
registration centres and had left with the keys. ... In Bhobhoyi, Murchison and Jesus
Location people braved the rain on Thursday to put their names on the voters' roll only to
find that there were no officials at the stations. They returned on Friday to find the same
situation. Officials arrived only at 2pm to register the few that had waited ...
4.1 Evaluation by the lEe
Judge Kriegler indicated on Friday 4 December that he was genuinely not disappointed with the
way things had been going despite the opposition parties' cries over the disorganisation. Judge
Kriegler claimed that registration had been hampered by faulty equipment, failure of stations to
open, as well as heavy rains in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape (The Daily News,
3 December 1998; The Citizen, 4 December 1998; The Sunday Tribune, 6 December 1998). Low
turnout in these areas, according to Judge Kriegler, was the result of heavy rains. For this reason
he announced that the registration due to end on Saturday 5 December, was being extended by
the IEC to Sunday, 6 December 1998 (The Citizen, 4 December 1998; The Sunday Times, 6
December 1998).
By the end of the first round of registration the IEC had managed to register about 2000 153
potential voters (or 36,8%) out of 5 440 548 voting population in the province (see Table 4.3
below).
5. VOTER REGISTRATION IN THE EASTERN CAPE
Most areas of the Eastern Cape were as badly affected by heavy rains as KwaZulu-Natal during
the first two days of registration. The communication system in the Eastern Cape was severely
disrupted by heavy rains as the telephone lines were down in this period. This resulted in many
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stations in the Transkei and around Umtata not opening (EISA, 1998(3)). As Table 4.3 below
indicates, voter registration progress in the Eastern Cape turned out to be almost similar in
number to that of KwaZulu-Natal. Only 1 351 688 out of the census population of 3819381
potential voters (or 35,4% of the voting population in the province) had turned out to register
during the first round of registration.
Otherwise, reports on voter registration in the Eastern Cape for this period were very limited.
6. VOTER REGISTRATIONS IN THE FREE STATE PROVINCE
Heavy rains in the South-Eastern Free State also made it difficult for the staff and the public to
access the stations. According to The Star (4 December 1998), about 20 registration stations in
Bloemfontein, and some in Botshabelo, could not open. At the end of the first round of
registration, the IEC indicated that it had registered a total of 722 765 voters (or 41,9% out of a
1 726083 total voting population) in the province. Although the number is smaller than in the
first two southern Provinces, it is much higher in percentage terms by comparison (see Table 4.3
below).
7. VOTER REGISTRATION IN THE WESTERN CAPE
Voter registration in the Western Cape rural areas had a smooth start when compared to the
Cape metropolitan area where staff shortages led to 27 registration stations not opening on the
first day (EISA, 1998(3). According to Business Day (8 December 1998), nearly a third of
registration stations could not produce any registration figures. However, out of the census
voting population of 2 776110 in the Western Cape, about 807029 people (or 29,1% of the
census voting population (see Table 4.3 below)) did register in the first round of registration.
Some media reports on the progress of voter registration in the Western Cape are as follows:
• Cape Argus, 4 December 1998, Voters trickle in to sign up for poll, Snags and gremlins
hit IEC's three-day election drive
Serious problems encountered in all provinces included absence or shortages of electoral
officials and the failure of "zip-zip" electronic scanners meant to issue barcoded receipts
as proof of registration. In the Western Cape, two cars were stolen and four registration
tents lost. Ten registration centres in Khayelitsha were closed, and other venues in the
peninsula were plagued by staf! shortages forcing the half-day closure of some of them.
But for thousands of people the registration process was painless. Armed with their
barcoded identity documents they went to their designated registration centres, confirmed
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their addresses, filled in aform, had their receipts pasted into their ID books and were out
again in minutes.
• The Citizen, 4 December 1998, Rain, logistics bog down registration
In the Western Cape voter registration was going well, although staff at some registration
points arrived late, an official said. In Khayelitsha several registration stations did not
open by 9:00 am and people who arrived to register went home. In some parts of the
sprawling townships people were shunted from pillar to post as they turned up at wrong
registration posts. At the Strand Municipality about 100 people queued to register shortly
after 8am. In Mitchell's Plain on the Cape Flats all but one registration centre opened,
while in Belhar equipment, maps and volunteers arrived late at most centres. Reports were
received from Mowbray that people could not register because officials did not seem to
know what to do ...
7.1 Complaints on irregularities
In the Western Cape opposition parties complained of irregularities in voter registration. They
claimed that people with reference books without barcodes were registered at some stations. In
response the IEC indicated that such people would not be accepted by IEC computers and
therefore would not get onto the voters' roll (EISA, 1998(3)). Opposition parties also complained
about people wearing the ANC insignia being present at registration stations. The ANC
spokesperson indicated that it had used its own vehicles to take IEC officials and their
equipment to Khayelitsha and indicated that the Electoral Act had not been contravened since no
ANC office bearers had been sworn in to help voters to register (The Sunday Independent, 6
December 1998).
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8. THE NATIONALREGISTRATION TOTALS PER PROVINCE
The following table, Table 4.3 portrays the provincial registration totals at the end of round one.
Table 4.3: National Registration Progress-Voter Registration Round 1
Population - Population - Number % Registered
Province Census Actual Registered census
Eastern Cape 3 819381 3 863 149 1 351 688 35,4
Free State 1 726083 1 786371 722765 41,9
Gauteng 5512651 5689764 2119139 38,4
KwaZulu-Natal 5440548 5494445 2000 153 36,8
Mpumalanga 1 685 324 1 738960 679508 40,3
Northern Cape 536 157 560891 212770 39,7
Northern Province 2684690 2813 093 1 070535 39,9
North West Province 2 174896 2213 080 791 056 36,4
Western Cape 2776 110 2800464 807029 29,1
Total 26355840 26960217 9754643 37,0
Source: IEC Progress Report, 20 January 1999, in EISA 1999(4):2
Table 4.3 indicates the total population of26 355840 as per census statistics and the actual total
of 26 960 217. According to section 1(xxv), chapter one of the Electoral Act (no 73 of 1998), the
term 'voting population' refers to the citizens of South Africa who are 18 years of age and above
during the election period. These citizens, according to the Act, should be in possession of valid
identity documents and should be registered on the common voters' roll in order to vote. Table
5.6 in chapter 5 gives a new total of the voting population, following the updating of the voters'
roll.24
The above data in Table 4.3 indicate that by the end of the first round of registration the IEC had
managed to register a total of9 754 643 voters, which amounts to 37,0% of the registered census
population. Whether this could be regarded as a success or failure on the part of the IEC depends
on the evaluation of the target the IEC had set itself for this period. In making such an evaluation
it needs to be taken into account that the IEC had initially planned to register the whole country
over 16 days and had had to reduce this period to 6 days as a result of budget constraints
(Interview: Russon, 14 July 1999). These registrations had been aimed at registering the entire
population, but could manage to register only 37,0% of the census population. Table 4.4
indicates the registration statistics by age and gender.
24 Also see footnote 26 below.
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Table 4.4: First Round of Registration by Age and Gender25
Age Group Male Female Total Age Group %
16-18 7798 7810 15608 0,9
18-20 98948 101 889 200837 11,6
20-30 993 864 1206564 2200428 28,6
30-40 987296 1 289371 2276667 38,4
40-50 861 051 1 040055 1 901 106 48,2
50-60 587014 738864 1 325 878 54,8
60-70 364786 618236 983022 57,6
70-80 210460 348897 559357 62,9
>80 65402 129681 195083 59,7
Total 4176619 5481367 9657986
Source: IEC, 11 January 1999, In EISA Election Update No 4, p 3
Table 4.4 indicates the lowest registration rate among the youngest age group. The data indicate
that only 15608 (or 0,9%) of the youth between the ages of 16 -18 years, made up of 7 798
males and 7 810 females, were registered in the first round of registration. Only 11,6% of the
youth between the ages of 18-20 years were registered in the same period and 28,6% of the age
group of 20-30 years. It is clear according to Table 4.4 that the trend for registration tends to
increase with an increase in age. The registration percentage is at its lowest point at 0,9% in the
youngest age group of 16-18 years. The rate increases up to a maximum of 62,9% for the age
group 70-80 years and starts declining to 59,7% for the age group above 80 years. Another
noticeable trend is a continuous relatively better turnout of women compared to men in the first
round of registration.
Attempts to explain the latter trend may point to the efforts of the NGO's such as the Women's
Development Foundation and the Gender Advocacy Programme, whose efforts were directed at
mobilising women politically. Another explanation, which might be controversial, is that as
women still constitute a larger section of the unemployed population in South Africa, they might
have had more time to register than men (The Sunday Times, 13 December 1998).
According to the age and gender turnout in this round it is clear that a substantial contribution to
the low registration statistic was the lower rate of participation by the youth, especially the first-
time voters. If it is a general trend that the younger generation tends to show lower rates of
political participation, then it should make sense for any political activity like voter registration
to focus its campaigns on this age group in future if political participation is to be improved.
25 The total of9 657 986 was later updated by the lEe on 20 January 1999 to 9 754 643, see table 4.3.
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Although several factors were highlighted during the process of voter registration which may
have contributed to low registration turnout, the political parties blamed the low turnout on the
lEC's poor organisation and inadequate information rather than on disillusionment among voters
(The Star, 8 December 1998; The Sunday Times, 6 December 1998). In addition to these
accusations, the DP added that the lack of barcoded ID's among first-time voters was another
factor (The Star, 8 December 1998). The NNP complained that November was a poor month for
registration among students. In contrast, the ANC felt that young people did not have the
patience to go from station to station to find out where the registration venues were (Sowetan, 8
December 1998; The Sunday Times, 6 December 1998). As a result of the lower turnout in the
first round of registration, the IEC indicated that a second round of registration was to take place
on 29-31 January 1999. A third round of registration was to be announced when the election
date was known. To this effect, the Chief Electoral Officer of the IEC indicated in a press
briefing on 8 January that the second round of registration would be more successful in terms of
preparation (The Star, 9 January 1999). He added that the next round was not going to have the
'glitches' like the last time.
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The first round of registration was the first of its kind in South Africa and unfolded in a rather
thought-provoking manner in that, as an analysis of this round might have answered some
questions, many questions still remain unanswered. Further, the nature of the problems,
challenges and difficulties in this round of registration also raised a series of new questions.
The data in this chapter indicate that some of the problems during the registration period
included the public not finding registration personnel in most registration stations. Secondly, the
public, who were willing to register were not properly informed of the correct registration
venues and found themselves at the wrong stations. If there had been any question regarding the
willingness of the public to participate in their country's political affairs, this scenario is food for
thought. The picture obtained from this scenario is that public political participation does not
only depend on the will of the public to do so, but also on the extent to which the conditions are
conducive for this practice to take place. In the case of South Africa's voter registration, such
conditions would have included the availability of registration personnel. The list of conditions
would include the presence of basic infrastructure such as reliable venues for registration and a
usable road system, as well as the availability of general and necessary information, i.e. accurate
information regarding the time and venues for registration. This list would include a voter
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education programme, which has been lacking in this process (The Sunday Times, 6 December
1998; The Citizen, 7 December 1998).
Although the above data do not indicate that the requirement for a barcoded identity document
had any special mention during this round of registration, the question remains to what extent
this provision did affect the registration statistics. To answer this question the impact played by
each factor that has been identified as a milestone during registrations needs to be calculated.
With a variety of other factors involved during the registration period it remains difficult for the
influence of the ID requirement to be measured. The question that still needs answering pertains
to whether the statistics of the first round of registration could have been any different had the
lEe had enough personnel, an elaborate voter education programme, and adequate information
regarding registration venues, had all its registration stations opened, had there been no
provision for barcoded identity documents, and had the weather been favourable in the southern
regions. It is expected that the second round of registration, to be described in the next section,
would, by comparison, give some answers to these questions, or to some of them. In its analysis
of the final rounds of registration the following chapter will focus on these questions.
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CHAPTERS
THE FINAL ROUNDS OF REGISTRATION
1. INTRODUCTION
The preceding chapter discussed both the preparations as well as the first round of registration. It
is clear from this analysis that the IEC had initially planned to register the whole country over a
16-day period. The data also indicate that the IEC had to reduce this period to 6 days as a result
of budget constraints. Of interest to this observation is the question whether the IEC had
believed that it could register the whole voting-age population over this short space of time, and
whether this was a realistic expectation. To answer this question, the registration progress after 6
days indicates that only 37,0% of the voting population had been registered over this period.
While this low percentage could be explained in terms of various factors outside the control of
the IEC, there is no evidence from the account that in the preceding chapter the expectation was
realistic.
One of the major difficulties experienced by the IEC during the first round of registrations was
the staff shortage. As indicated in the preceding chapter, the plans by the IEC to train 72 000
people with the right kind of expertise were frustrated by financial constraints. With these
constraints still in place before the second round of registration, the question arose as to how the
IEC was addressing the problem in a way different from that of the first round of registration.
On a positive note, reiterating Mchunu and Kriegler's sentiments that the first round provided
educative experience for the next rounds, it would be appropriate to expect an improved second
round. This chapter analyses the second as well as the final rounds of registration in terms of
what was gained from earlier experience.
2. PREPARATIONS FOR REGISTRATION-ROUND II
The IEC began preparing for registration round two soon after the end of the first round, which
ended on 6 December 1998. To do this it had to take stock of the practical factors that had had a
negative impact on the first round of registrations. These factors ranged from the problems of
malfunctioning scanners, staff shortages, poor advertising, and the non-opening of several
stations. Another problem, according to the IEC Chief Electoral officer, Mchunu, was the
turning away of voters from their nearest stations to other stations in certain centres during
round one (The Saturday Star, 9 JanuaryI999). According to Mchunu, this was caused by the
tightness of the timetable. To address this problem the civil servants were asked to arrive as
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early as Monday 25 January in preparation for registrations on 29-31 January 1999 (The
Saturday Star, 9 January 1999; Sowetan, 12 January 1999). Mchunu indicated that further
measures included the decentralisation of the registration administration which included the
appointment of area managers with each manager being given the responsibility for 10-15
stations in rural areas and 20 stations in urban areas. Area managers were to ensure that their
stations opened on time and were properly equipped (Sowetan, 12 January 1999).
To counter the youth apathy problem as witnessed during November and December 1998, the
IEC planned a road show to take the IEC Chief Electoral Officer to tertiary institutions as part of
a youth outreach programme (The Star, 25 January 1999). On the same note, the National Youth
Commission embarked on a poster campaign to areas with low media penetration such as taxi
ranks, as well as advertising through African-language radio (EISA, 1999(5): 1).
Having completed its preparations the IEC indicated to the media on 11 January 1999 that it was
better prepared for the second round of registration than it had been for the previous one
(Sowetan, 12 January 1999).
3. REGISTRATIONS
Unlike the first round where registration was divided into two phases between the northern and
southern Provinces, the second round began simultaneously in all nine Provinces on 29 January
1999. Table 5.1 displays the progress in terms of the percentage change in registration statistics
after the second round of registrations.
Table 5.1: Voter Registration Progress Per Province after Round _1126
Province Voting-age Registered Registered % Percent
Population after after Registered Increase
by Census Round-I Round- II Census
Eastern Cape 3819381 1 351 688 1 999952 52,4 17,0
Free State 1 726083 722765 1 001443 58,0 16,1
Gauteng 5512651 2 119 139 3462205 62,8 24,4
KwaZulu-Natal 5440548 2000 153 2787708 51,2 14,4
Mpumalanga 1 685 324 679508 1 053 834 62,5 22,2
Northern Cape 536 157 212 770 309218 57,7 22,7
Northern Province 2684690 1 070535 1 589998 59,2 18,0
North West 2174896 791 056 1 284928 59,2 19,3
Western Cape 2776 110 807029 1 280 121 46,1 17,0
Total 26355840 9754643 14769407 56,0 19,0
26 Table 4.10 indicates a new voting-age population of 22,8 million after the voters' roll was reconciled with the
population register.
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Source: IEC, 17 February 1999, In EISA 1999(4) & (7)
Table 5.1 displays comparative statistics of registration progress between the first and second
rounds of registration per Province. According to this data, a total of 9754643 potential voters
(or 37% of the total of 26355 840 voters) had been registered during the first round of
registration. As Table 5.1 indicates, this number increased by only 19,0% in the second round, to
14 769 407 (or 56% of the total voting population). While Table 5.1 will be discussed further in
the later parts of this chapter, the following section will discuss the actual registration process
per Province over the second round of registration.
4. THE EASTERN CAPE
The following section describes the registration process in the Eastern Cape over the second
round of registration.
4.1 Background
During the first round of registration there were about 3 819 381 potential voters in the Eastern
Cape. Of this total, the lEC managed to register about 1 351 688 potential voters by the end of
registration round 1 (Table 5.1). It could be argued that the target for the second round would be
to come as close as possible to the voting population total. Once the preparations were complete
the lEC officials remained positive of their readiness to do well (Daily Dispatch, 28 January
1999; Eastern Province Herald, 29 January 1999).
4.2 The Registration Process
During the early hours of the first day of registration, Friday 29 January, various reports
indicated a slow start to registration, which speeded up again towards the afternoon of the
second day, Saturday 30 January (Daily Dispatch, 30 January 1999). The registration staff
comprising civil servants and the SANDF had been trained and the technical equipment was all
in good order in all registration offices (about 2 573) around the province (EISA, 1999(6):7). By
the end of the second round the lEC had registered about 648 264 voters, which is the difference
between the number registered during round one, i.e. 1 351 688 and the total registered after
round two, i.e. 1 999952. To put it differently, the registration percentage increased by 17,0%
from 35,4% to 52,4% in the Eastern Cape during the second round of registration (see Table 5.1
above). As various observers and reporters expressed satisfaction at the end of the process
during the night of 31 January that the registration had been done well, it became clear that the
difficulties experienced during December 1998 in the Province had been successfully ironed out.
EISA observers believed that this smooth running of registration may have been an outcome of
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military efficiency, as most stations they visited, such as in the Albany area, were run by the
SANDF (EISA, 1999(6):8). This evaluation by reporters and observers should be seen rather as
relative in comparison to the first round of registration rather than as referring to the absolute
absence of problems. The second round of registration did have its share of problems.v'
4.3 Low Registration Turnout
Although large numbers of young people were seen at registration stations around the
Ntabelanga district, many of them did not have identity documents and could not register.
According to The Representative (5 February 1999) this could have been the reason why young
people had not registered during the first phase. Many people in the districts of King Williams
Town and Sterkspruit, including the youth, came in their numbers without either the identity
document or temporary document (Kei Mercury, 4 February 1999; The Representative,
5 February 1999). While the lEC blamed low turnout in the region on the lack of correct identity
documents, a co-ordinator of Grahamstown's voter education agency, Thembinkosi Lehloesa,
felt that the IEC had not done a good job in its public awareness campaign (The Sunday
Independent, 14 February 1999). The real issue according to Lehloesela was that the lEC had
not told the people that they should bring their barcoded ID's.
Finally, the overall report of registration in the Eastern Cape indicated that these problems, in
contrast to the first round, were more of an exception rather than the rule.
5. THE WESTERN CAPE
5.1 Background
In terms of the census statistics the Western Cape Province had a total voting-age population of
2776 110 during the registration period. Of this number the lEC had managed to register 29,1%,
translating into a total of 807 029 voters, during the first round of registrations (Table 4.5). This
statistic was the lowest by comparison with any other province nationally. While the reasons
behind the low turnout remained uncertain, speculations were made on possible factors such as
apathy, disillusionment and protest, especially among the Coloured people in the Western Cape.
The Coloured people are the largest population group, constituting about 56% of the population
27 The following problems were experienced during registration in the Eastern Cape Province: Cl) Tornado
Disaster at Mt Ayliff, (2) Incorrect ID's in Port St Johns, (3) Opening delays in Mdansane, (4) Taxi violence at
Libode, (5) Political Parties in conflict-OP and UDM Border region accusing the ANC of threatening UDM
members and of destroying OP posters. The ANC supporters were also alleged to have disrupted the
registration of disabled people by an IEC official whom they accused of favouring UDM members. The ANC
further alleged that the farmers in the Alexandria district were threatening their workers and preventing them
from registering to vote (Daily Dispatch, 30 January 1999 & 4 February 1999; Eastern Province Herald, 4/5
Feb 1999).
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in the Province (EISA, 1999(6):12). To test the political preferences of the group, Dr Steven
Robins of the University of the Western Cape had conducted an opinion poll among the
Coloured people of Worcester during the registration preparations (EISA, 1999(6):12-13).
According to this poll the disillusionment and protest of some could have been a result of
unfavourable perceptions by the group on the slow delivery of public services in traditionally
Coloured areas by the government structures (Robins, in EISA 1999(6)). To counter this trend
the lEC established a task team to work with religious groups of all faiths, youth organisations,
the business sector, the Department of Education, political parties, the media and other
governmental structures in popularising voter registration in the province (Robins, in EISA
1999(6)).
5.2 Registration
The low registration patterns that were manifested in the Western Cape in the first round of
registration seem to have continued over the second round. By the end of registration on 31
January 1999 the lEC had managed to increase registrations by only a mere 17,0% above the
original 29,1% from round one. As Table 5.1 indicates, by the end of round two of registration
only 46,1% of the voting population had been registered in Western Cape. Although
registrations went considerably well in comparison to round one, the low registration turnout
remained an unsolved problem as the Province continued with its lowest registration tradition by
comparison to other provinces. Perhaps the uniqueness of the political climate in the Province
played a major role in determining the public turnout during the whole registration progress.i"
6. THE NORTH WEST PROVINCE
6.1 Background
The problems encountered in the first round included the malfunctioning of scanners, poor
information to potential voters, staff shortages in certain areas as well as the failure to open on
time, if at all, by certain registration stations (The Star, 27 November 1998; The Sunday Times,
29 November 1998). The overall problem that resulted from this scenario was an inadequate
registration rate that led to the scheduling of the second round of registrations.
In an attempt to alleviate the low rate in the province, the lEC met with District Electoral
Officers in areas that had not produced more than 50% registration rates during the first round.
28 Although the extent of problems seen in other provinces was less significant in the Western Cape (Cape
Argus, 4 December 1998; The Citizen, 4 December 1998), the survey conducted in Worcester indicates that
dissatisfaction with service delivery by Government structures could explain low registrations rates in
predominantly Coloured areas in the Province (EISA(3), 1999).
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The aim was to ascertain the reasons and possibly take corrective measures (Manson, in EISA
1999(7): 19). This effort revealed that a less than 50% registration turnout had taken place only
in the southern areas such as Klerksdorp and Potchefstroom, including large White-owned farms
in the Province. There had hardly been such a problem in villages throughout the rest of the
Province. According to Manson (in EISA1999 (7):18-19), the IEC further identified areas with
less than 40% registration in the Province and conducted a door-to-door campaign to increase
awareness of registration in such areas. Having identified the problem areas from the previous
registration and having dealt with them, the IEC felt that its preparations had been an
improvement on the first round and it was more than ready for the second round of registration
(Manson, in EISA 1999(7):20).
6.2 The Registration process
By the end of the second round a further 18,0% percent had been registered thus increasing the
registrations to 1 589998 (or 59,2% of the voting population in the Province) (see Table 5.1).
Minor problems were reported in the North West.29
7. KwaZULU-NATAL
7.1 Background
In addition to staffing problems, poor advertisement of registration venues and the
malfunctioning scanner machines, the first round of registrations in KwaZulu-Natal and the
Eastern Cape had been further hampered by heavy rainfalls. As a result, the former Province
could only register 36,8% of its voting population during the first round. This percentage
translates to 2 000 153 out of the total voting population of 5440548 in the Province (see Table
5.1) which indicates that many voters had still not registered by the end of round one of
registration. Itwas thus necessary to hold a second round of registration on 29-31 January 1999.
7.2 Preparations
Among the political parties, the ANC indicated its concern about the low turnout in urban areas
(EISA, 1999(7):22). The Party placed more emphasis on registration awareness programmes
which included a visit by the ANC President to the Province, door-to-door canvassing,
'walkabouts', road shows, and meetings with teachers and student sectors. The IFP in contrast
indicated that it had embarked on mass communication campaigns, making use of loud hailers to
make announcements and encourage voter registrations in most rural areas (EISA, 1999(7):22).
29 The Provincial branch of the ANC raised the problem of the obstruction of the electoral process by certain
farmers in Zeerust and Lehurutse in January (The Mafikeng Mail, 19 February 1999).
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Other preparations included general strategies outlined by the IEC Head Office at the end of
round one of registration. These ranged from the decentralisation of administrative powers,
closer and stricter negotiations with civil servants to avail themselves and to arrive on time, as
well as an increased awareness campaign on registration days and at venues in the Province
(Jones et al., in EISA 1999(6)).
7.3 The Registration Process
At the end of registration the total of the registered voting population had only increased from
36,8% to 51,2%, which is a 14,4% increment (see Table 5.1). In general, registration can be said
to have improved since the number of reported problems" was minimal during this round of
registrations. Although the registration process was regarded as having improved, the low
turnout remained a source for concern for both the IEC and the political parties and might have
contributed to the lEC's thoughts for a third round of registration.
8. THE NORTHERN CAPE
8.1 Background
The Northern Cape had not been exempted from the countrywide problems of the first round of
registration. Central to the problems was the high illiteracy rate, and ignorance and confusion in
the rural areas (Robins, in EISA 1999(7): 12). These difficulties, combined with staff shortages
and poor advertisement by the IEC contributed to the low registration rate of 35,0% during the
first round (see Table 5.1). Having learnt from the difficulties of round one, the IEC had to
introduce several strategies to improve the registration rate in round two.
8.2 Preparations
The Provincial Electoral Officer (PEO), Gugu Matlaopane, indicated that the major problem of
low registration turnout in rural areas was caused largely by vast distances and poor
communication in these areas (Robins, in EISA 1999(7):12-13). The PEO further identified rural
illiteracy, lack of information, confusion and youth apathy as the other contributing factors. In
preparation for the next round of registration the IEC engaged in a fact finding exercise to
identify ways of overcoming these and other logistical problems (Robins, in EISA 1999(7):12-
13). The IEC personnel of the Kimberley office, and the Home Affairs Officials spent two
weeks travelling and gathering information for improving and facilitating registration processes
30 Registrations were brought forward in the Cool Air area to accommodate a Hindu festival on the 29-31
January, faction fights delayed registrations at Msinga district on 29 January, and the NNP complained of
some registration staff wearing the ANC insignia at registration stations on the first day (Goodenough, C in
EISA 1999(6)).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
70
across the Northern Cape. The information gained enabled the IEC to plan for mobile voter
stations to be used during elections (Robins, in EISA 1999(7):12-13).
In addition, the Northern Cape Youth Commission held meetings and distributed pamphlets at
taxi ranks, railway stations and schools. Radio talk shows, door-to-door voter mobilisation, mass
education workshops, street canvassing, media publicity and the provision of a toll free help line
in Kimberley were among the voter-education outreach programmes planned by the IEC
Northern Cape branch (Robins, in EISA 1999(7):12-13). To increase this effort, the IEC also
provided assistance to the unemployed and those in old age homes and hospitals, with special
emphasis on the disadvantaged areas. Further, the disabled and pregnant women could ask for
home visits (Robins, in EISA 1999(7):12-13). The effectiveness of these campaigns could only
be judged by the success of the actual registration process. Such success could clearly be
measured in terms of the registration turnout as discussed in the following section below.
8.3 Registration
About 35% of the voting population of 536 157 in the Northern Cape had been registered in the
first round of registration (see Table 4.5). The continued confusion and lack of adequate
information for the public had complicated registration. Long distances, illiteracy and the lack of
information had contributed greatly to this situation in the Province during the first round.
Despite minor problems'! during the second round of registration, another 22,7% of the
population were registered, thus increasing the number of registered voters to a new total of
309218 (or 57,7%) (see Table 4.5 above). This success could possibly be attributed to the
preparatory awareness campaign.
9. GAUTENG
9.1 Background
Gauteng is one of the five northern Provinces that provided the IEC with its first registration
experience in the country. The most common problem throughout the Province was that of poor
information and the shortage of registration personnel in most registration stations. As a result
the IEC could register only 38,4% of the voting-age population during the first round of
registrations (Table 4.3). The IEC indicated that it had learnt from these experiences and was
working to improve them before the second round of registrations (Business Day, 8 &
31 The Provincial Electoral Officer complained of farmers not allowing workers time off, to register for voting.
The officer also complained of the unrealistic stipulations by the lEC in terms of the size of voter districts in
the case of rural areas as the conditions requireD most people to travel extremely long distances (EISA,
1999(7)).
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11December 1998). One item to be improved was the distribution of pamphlets to inform the
public of registration venues. The mobilisation of the youth and first time voters was another
area of focus (Business Day, 8 & 11 December 1998; The Sunday Independent, 6 December
1998).
9.2 The Registration Process
While the second round in Gauteng opened at a sound rate in White suburban areas, registration
in African townships was reported as progressing at a less than enthusiastic pace (Sowetan, 24
February 1999). Regarding this feature, the National Working Committee of the ANC had
circulated a confidential memorandum indicating concern about the greater proportion of White
voters who had registered in comparison to Black voters. The memorandum indicated that
registration was even poorer within Coloured and Indian neighbourhoods (Sowetan, 24 February
1999). The memorandum expressed even greater concern for the continued low turnout rate by
Black first time voters, the majority of whom did not posses identity documents.
By the end of the second round, the registration rate had increased by 24,4%, from 38,4% to
62,8% or a new total of 1 00 1 443 voters out of the total voting-age population of 5 512 651 in
the Province (see Table 5.1 above).
10. MPUMALANGA
10.1 Background
A substantial proportion of the areas of the Mpumalanga Province is rural. Rural areas, by
virtue of their remoteness, low technological and infrastructural development, tend to have an
additional set of difficulties compared to urban areas (interview: Russon, 14 July 1999). Russon
indicated that the lack of electricity in schools, inaccessible roads and poor tele-communication
systems had in a measure contributed to a lower registration rate in most rural areas during the
first round of registration. Despite the Province being partly rural, it managed to attain the
second highest registration in the first round, with a registration rate of 40,3% (see Table 5.1
above). This relative success in the first round did not minimise the problems reported in
Mpumalanga which indicated that the province was no exception to rural difficulties. Hopefully
this rate could improve during the second round.
10.2 The Registration Process
Registration was again successful in Mpumalanga, with a further 22,2% of voters being added to
the registered population by the end of round two. This meant that the Province had registered a
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total of 1 053 834 (or 62,5% of the total voting population of 1 685324) by the end of round two
(see Table 5.1 above).
11. THE FREE STATE PROVINCE
11.1 Background
Although this Province had its share of the common problems as did the rest of the country
during round one, heavy rainfalls in the eastern parts of the Province might have contributed to
the low registration turnout in 1998 (The Star, 4 December 1998). With an improvement in
weather and in the general working conditions in the second round, the IEC and the public had
every right to hope for an improved registration rate, as discussed below.
11.2 The Registration Process
By addressing the problems of the first round in its preparations for the second round, the IEC
managed to assist in adding another 16,1% of voters to the voters' roll (see Table 5.1 above).
This addition extended the total of registered voters from 41,9% to 58,0% in the Province.
Improved weather probably also assisted the higher registration rate. The rate could possibly be
improved further, should a third round of registration take place.
12. THE NORTHERN PROVINCE
12.1 Background
This Province achieved a 39,9% registration of its 2 684 690 voting age population during the
first round of registration. Problems similar to those in the North West and the Northern Cape
had been experienced in the province during the first round, with the IEC taking national
measures to address them, resulting in additional 18,0% registration in the second round of
registration. As table 5.1 indicate, a total of 59,9% of potential voters had been registered by the
end of the second round in the province.
13. The Total Registration Process
Table 4.4 indicates a national total voting population of26 355 840 as per census data which had
to be registered during the voter registration period. A total of 9754643 or 37,0% of the
national voting population was registered during the first round of registration. In attempting to
improve this registration performance the IEC held a second round of registration from 29-31
January 1999. In its plans the IEC used several strategies to address the problems that had
hampered the first round of registration. Data from the second round of registration indicate that
the IEC was able to add only 19,0% of voters to the voters' roll (see Table 5.1). This translates
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into 56% of the registered voting population by the end of January 1999. The inadequacy of this
percentage is evident from the initial indication by the lEC that a minimum registration rate of
70% was required for the elections. The National Party and the DP had opposed this figure in
favour of a higher registration percentage of 80% or more (The Star, 8 March 1999).
While this total was low enough to raise concern among different stakeholders, the question
remained as to what the situation might have been, had there been no limitation in terms of
identity documents. To give the public an additional opportunity to register, the lEC opened a
third round of registration during the periods 5-6 March and 12-15 March 1999 as well as after
the outcome of the court cases as discussed in the following section.
14. THE THIRD ROUND OF REGISTRATION
14.1 Background
The lEC had registered only 56,0% of the voting-age population during the first two rounds of
registration (Table 5.1).32 Because this percentage was low, the Commission had to find ways to
encourage people to register. One of the ways was the strengthening of the efforts by the lEC
and the Department of Home Affairs to encourage applications for the new barcoded identity
document throughout the country. This was accompanied by an extension of the registration
period to round three as will be discussed in the following section (Jones et al., in EISA,
1999(8)).
15. PREPARATIONS
The following section discusses the forms of preparation that were conducted by the lEC,
political parties, the Government and other non-Governmental organisations in an attempt to
increase registration during the final stage.
15.1 The Votani Mawethu" Campaign
The third round began with an intensified countrywide campaign by the Department of Home
Affairs to persuade the public to apply for barcoded identity documents. At the end of February
1999 the Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, launched the Votani Mawethu Campaign, in which
the towns on the East Rand were visited by officials of the Department of Home Affairs (The
Star, 3 March 1999). The officials encouraged the people to collect their ID's at the Department's
offices, while at the same time encouraging new applications for barcoded ID's (The Star, 1, 3;
32
33
Also see the section "Updating the Voters' Roll" later in this chapter for a further description of the voting
population figures.
A Xhosa phrase which urges "our-people" to Vote, Votani is to Vote, Mawethu means Our People.
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and 5 March 1999). This campaign resulted in long queues of ID applications in Soweto,
Randburg, Wynberg, and Gauteng Home Affairs Offices during 2 March 1999. To cope with the
demand the Gauteng Home Affairs offices stayed open throughout the weekend (The Star, 3 and
5 March 1999)
15.2 Registration Campaign through Sport
To strengthen its voter registration campaign, the IEC extended its awareness campaigns to the
soccer fans at an international soccer match between South Africa and Gabon, as well as at
rugby matches in Pretoria on 27 February 1999 (Jones et al., in EISA 1999(8):2). The campaign
included the distribution of promotional material to the fans in and on their way to the stadiums.
In addition, aerial awareness messages were flown around the stadiums. The teams. were also
asked to wear the IEC T-shirts in promotion of the registration campaign on the day (Jones et
aI., in EISA 1999(8):2).
16. UPDATING A VOTERS' ROLL
In preparation for the third round of registration on 2 March 1999 the IEC began to check the
existing names on the current voters' roll against the population register of the Department of
Home Affairs. On 4 March 1999 the Officials of the IEC, Home Affairs, and Statistics South
Africa met in Pretoria to discuss, correct and finalise the total of the voting-age population in
South Africa. The findings indicated that the current voting-age population total of 26355 840
(see Table 4.3) in the current census statistics was both too high and thus misleading. The excess
numbers included, among others, many unauthorised voters such as under-aged citizens;
581 000 non-permanent residents; 150 000 convicts and prisoners awaiting trial; 97 000 South
Africans living permanently abroad; and 1 358 000 South Africans without barcoded identity
documents. The outcome of the meeting was the declaration by the IEC of a new official total of
22,8 million34 potential voters in South Africa (Russon, Media release: 7 March 1999).
In addition, the IEC also removed approximately 120 000 people from the voters' roll for the
following reasons:
• About 8 664 voters who had registered had been reported dead in the population register;
• About 86 384 voters had either an incorrect form of identification or were regarded by the
population register as foreigners.
• Some people were discovered to be under age.
34 The latest "Opinion '99" data, according to Bob Mattes of Idasa, indicated a total voting-age population of
23,9 million of which only 79% had registered (Business Day, 10 June 1999).
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Furthermore, registered voters could check their names on the interim voters' roll at various
registration stations to allow any necessary corrections to be made in time (The Star, 3 March;
Russon, The State of the Voters' roll, 31 April 1999). According to the Sowetan (8 March 1999)
a significant number of people who checked their names at some stations in Soweto could not
find their names on the voters' roll. The report indicated that about 50% of the people who
checked their names at the same stations could not appear in the voters' roll. According to The
Star (8 March 1999) NNP leaders in Pretoria had claimed that more than 40 000 registered
people in the area were not recorded on the voters' roll in the first week of March. There were
further indications that 13 NNP provincial and national leaders could not find their names on the
voters' roll (The Citizen, 8 March 1999). While registered citizens continued to check their
names on the voters' roll, a Home Affairs official, Hennie Meyer indicated on 7 March that
applications for identity documents were still arriving at the Department's offices and were
likely to continue until 7 p.m. on the same evening. This, according to Meyer, was an indication
that more people were likely to apply for registration even after Sunday, the third and last day of
registration (The Citizen, 8 March 1999).
17. THE REGISTRATION PROCESS ON 5, 6 AND 7 MARCH 1999
According to the initial census statistics in Table 4.3, 56,0% of the voting population had been
registered during the first two rounds of registration. The third round of registration began on
3 March 1999. By the end of the first day the IEC reported the registration of more than 400 000
applicants. Registration figures declined on the second day. The pace appears to have increased
on the last day as the IEC indicated a total registration rate approaching 16 million or 70% at the
close of registration on Sunday 7 March (Jones et aI., in EISA, 1999(8)).
As the registration rate approached 70% that had previously been reported as the IEC goal, the
lEC Chief Electoral Officer, Mchunu, predicted that the IEC would soon close the voters' roll
(The Star, 8 March 1999). The IEC announced in its press release on 11 March 1999 (in EISA,
1999(8)) that it had managed to register over 17,2 million (or 75,4% of eligible voters) to date
and believed that the percentage would exceed 80% after the list had been completely updated.
In response to the IEC, the NNP leader, Van Schalkwyk, argued that additional time for
registration was needed. He argued that the long queues in Mitchell's Plain confirmed that there
were many applicants for identity documents who had spent the whole day(s) in queues and
could not have had time to register during this time. This argument was supported by the
AZAPO president, Mangena, who felt that many people had refrained from registering because
they confused registration with the actual election, and because they were disillusioned with the
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government (Sowetan, 8 March 1999). Groenewald of the Freedom Front complained that very
few people had registered. He added that an IEC official who had earlier agreed to set up a
registration station at the University of Potchefstroom during the second round had not done so,
and had been unhelpful ever since. On a positive note, the PAC spokesperson in the North West
pointed out that registration administration appeared to have improved drastically since the
second round (EISA, 1999(6):15). Furthermore, the DP and the ANC were also pleased with the
improvement in the registration administration in most provinces and were more concerned
about attacking each other on the issue of racial discrepancies in respective party lists than
reacting to the registration progress (EISA, 1999(7):20). In view of several considerations, the
IEC Chairperson, Ms Bam announced on Thursday, 11 March that registrations were to continue
from 9 am until 7 p.m. from Friday, 12 March until Monday, 15 March 1999 at existing
registration stations. This was done in order to allow for late applications for temporary
registration certificates in certain areas which ensure that further names were added to the voters'
roll (Jones et al., in EISA 1999(8)).
18. THE VOTERS' ROLL
Registration was finally closed on the evening of Monday 15 March 1999 despite the NNP's
request for the registration period to be extended (The Citizen, 16 March 1999; The Star, 23
March 1999). Due to time limitations the registrations could not be extended any longer as the
voters' roll needed updating several weeks ahead of the elections (Business Day, 23 March 1999;
The Citizen, 16 March 1999; The Star, 23 March 1999). The IEC had to prepare the final voters'
roll by 12 April to allow for appeals and corrections ahead of the general election on 2 June
1999 (Jones et al., in EISA 1999(8)).
The IEC could only finalise the voters' roll after the Constitutional Court had made its ruling on
the court cases between itself and the Prisoners Union, the NNP and the DP on 1 April 1999. On
this date the Constitutional Court ruled against the applications of the DP and NNP (see chapter
3). The Court ruled in favour of the application by the Prisoners Union that qualifying prisoners
should be allowed to vote. This ruling meant that the IEC had to register approximately 146 000
prisoners before the election date (August & Another vs. IEC and Others, 1999(4) cct8/99:380).
18.1 Finalisation of the Voters' roll
According to the press statement by the IEC Chief Director of Registration, Russon (7 March
1999), the cut-off date for registrations, i.e. 15 March, was only the first step or day one in the
process of finalising the voters' roll. The transitional voters' roll had to be checked for 15 days or
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until 30 March, after which refusals had to be announced and appeals received within a six day
period, i.e. until day number 21 or 5 April. Decisions on appeals were also made during a six-
day period, i.e. until day number 27 or 11 April. Following from this was the announcement of
venues for the public inspection of the provisional voters' roll with the actual inspection lasting
for a further seven days. Russon appealed to registered voters to continue checking their names
against the voters' roll by calling the IEC centre on a toll free number or accessing the web site
at www.elections.org.za. The IEC, according to the press statement, allowed another period of
seven days to receive objections to the voters' roll with another seven days for amendments. The
Final Voters' Roll was published on the so" day of this process, i.e. 5 May 1999.
18.2 The Final Voters' Roll
The following section discusses the process of the finalisation of the voters' roll.
18.2.1 Registration of Prisoners
After the High Court had ruled against the total disenfranchisement of prisoners on 1 April
1999, the IEC began its preparations for visiting 146000 (see Table 5.2) prisoners throughout
South Africa. Registration took place on 16, 17 and 18 April with the IEC Officials visiting 236
prisons and every police station in the country where prisoners were being held. Table 5.2
displays the national statistics of the registration of prisoners per province.
Table 5.2: Prisoners Registered per Province
Province # Prisoners registered Total # of Prisoners
Eastern Cape 3274
Free State 1 842
Gauteng 4437
}Cw~ulu-~atal 3079
Mpumalanga 1 572
North West 1 672
Northern Province 482
Northern Cape 1 110
Western Cape 3962
Total 21430 146000
Source: State of the Voters' Roll, IEC, 31 April 1999
At the end of a three-day period of hard work the IEC reported that a substantial number of
prisoners could not come forward to register. Table 5.2 indicates that the lEC could only
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register 21 430 out of a National total of 146 000 prisoners during this period (Russon, The State
of the Voters' Roll, lEC, 30 April 1999).
18.2.2 De-registrations/Rejections
In comparing the voter's roll against the population register of the Department of Home Affairs,
the lEC found that a total of 265 203 voters had registered illegitimately. These voters were
therefore rejected and de-registered from the voters' roll. Table 5.3 displays different reasons for
the voters' roll rejections per province.
Table 5.3: Voters' Roll Rejections As Per Population Register- Province by Reason
Reason for Non-Citizens Deceased Under Age Invalid ID's Total
Rejection
_.
Provinces
Eastern Cape 14265 3745 28096 2 46108
Free State 10740 2679 7448 1 20868
Gauteng 46866 6902 12 188 4 65960
}Cw~ulu-Natal 11 968 7 161 17754 5 36888
Mpumalanga 12618 2365 7243 0 22226
Northern Cape 739 750 2501 0 3990
NI Province 9733 2997 23576 1 36990
North West 8334 2997 8084 0 19415
Western Cape 5962 2044 5582 4 13 592
Total 121225 31489 112472 17 265203
Source: State of the Voters' Roll, lEC, 31 April 1999
According to Table 5.3 there were 121 225 people who had succeeded in registering as voters
while they were not citizens of South Africa in terms of the population register. According to
these data a further total of 31 489 people had registered from all nine provinces while holding a
deceased status in the population register. Another 112 472 people who had registered were
found to be under age in terms of the population register, while a small number of 17 people had
registered with invalid identity documents. After rejections were complete the Provisional
voters' roll was opened to the public for inspection, for lodging appeals and for raising
objections. The following table, Table 5.4 displays the number of appeals that were received and
voters who were re-instated by the lEC in each province.
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Table 5.4: Appeals Re-Instated by the IEC (Per Province)
Province ID Related Naturalised Citizens Total
Eastern Cape 14295 372 3463
Free State 2822 425 3247
Gauteng 8757 1 716 10470
FCvv~ulu-~atal 6540 465 7005
Mpumalanga 1 516 435 1 951
Northern Cape 1 975 23 1998
Northern Province 999 258 1257
North West 1 815 494 2309
Western Cape 6646 436 7082
Total 34158 4624 38782
Source: State of the Voters' Roll, IEC, 31 April 1999
According to the lEC's State of the Voters' Roll document (31 April 1999), members of the
public who had been rejected from the voters' roll or who were dissatisfied in any way with the
information recorded on the voters' roll were given a week until 6 April to lodge their appeals.
Table 5.5 displays the total number of public objections to the voters' roll, as well as the
accompanying reasons.
Table 5.5: Public Objections to the Voters' Roll (Reasons by totals)
Reason for Objection Numbers objecting
Incorrect voter details 857
Against inclusion in Voters' Roll 86
Against Exclusion from the Voters Roll 3225
Change of Names/Surname 289
Change of address 222
Total 4679
Source: State of the Voters' Roll, IEC, 31 April 1999
According to Table 5.5, a total of 4679 objections to the voters' roll was lodged by the public
with the IEC in this period. The IEC indicated in its State of the Voters' Roll (31 April 1999)
that it disapproved a sum of 1 475 objections in this total. Although this information may
indicate that 3 204 objections were accepted by the IEC, this number should not be mistaken as
reflecting an absolute increase or decrease of the voters' roll. Exercise of caution is necessary as
most objections to the data were not aimed solely at inclusion in or exclusion from the voters'
roll but at the amendment of details already existing in the voters' roll. It is evident from Table
5.4 that most objections - including those by 857 people whose details had been recorded
incorrectly, 289 who had changed names or surnames, and 222 people who had changed their
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addresses - referred only to the change of details rather than to inclusion in or exclusion from the
voters' roll. The data further indicate a sum of 86 people who objected to their inclusion in the
roll whilst 3 225 objected to their exclusion from the voters' roll. This mixture of numbers and
reasons for objections emphasises the need for caution in interpreting these data.
18.2.3 Causes for Rejection, Objections and Appeals to the Voters' Roll
Problems encountered by the IEC during the registration period, according to the State of the
Voters' Roll (31 April 1999), include the following:
• Identity Documents
The malfunctioning of the barcode scanners during the first round of registration resulted in
registrations being done manually in certain instances. Manual registration in tum led to errors
in recording voters' ID numbers. The errors caused some ID numbers to be rejected by the
system. On appeal these cases were upheld and reinstated by the IEC at a later stage. Moreover,
some potential voters used incorrect identity documents in their registration applications that
were erroneously accepted by the registration personnel. These applications were rejected by the
system. As it appeared on appeal that the error lay with the IEC registration staff, applicants who
had subsequently acquired correct ID's were upheld and re-instated.
• Deceased Persons
The IEC had received 31 489 applications for registration from people whose identification
details had been recorded in the population register as being deceased. The IEC found this
unacceptable de-registered them from the voters' roll. A substantial number of this section
appealed and were able to present their fingerprints. Others who were still alive and did not
appeal were de-registered and could not vote on 2 June 1999.
• On the problem of Citizenship:
According to the State of the Voters' Roll (31 April 1999), there was not much evidence of
inaccuracy in the data on citizenship. The main problem experienced by the IEC was that of the
citizens of the former TBVC states who still held ID books which designated them as non-South
African citizens. In dealing with this problem the IEC concentrated on the place of birth rather
than on the numeric sequence of ID numbers in registering voters. As a result, all applicants
could be included in the voters' roll. By the end of registration the IEC had registered about
79,7% (or the total of 18 172 751 voters) for the 1999 general elections (Russon, The State of the
voters' roll, 1999). Table 5.6 displays the total data of voter registration by province at the end of
the registration period.
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Table 5.6: Voter registration statistics per province+'
Province Official # Registered # Rejected % Registered
Electorate
Eastern Cape 22. 8 million 2454270 42645 75,9
Free State 1226174 17621 79,8
Gauteng 4 158574 55490 88,7
FCvv~ulu-~atal 3443978 29883 73,4
Mpumalanga 1 273 103 20275 82,3
Northern Cape 377194 1 992 78,4
Northern 1 847766 34899 76,6
Province
North West 1 527672 17106 80,6
Western Cape 1 864020 6510 80,4
Total 22.8 million 18172 751 226421 79,7
Source: State of the Voters roll, IEC 31 April 1999
Both Tables 4.3 and 5.1 indicate that South Africa, in terms of the latest census statistics, had a
total voting population of26 355 840 during the voter registration period.
It is also evident from these two sets of data that the IEC had reconciled its records with the
population register, and had made corrections as well as adjustments to this figure (See Section
15), leading to a new total of 22,8 million. Data on Table 5.6 are based on a newly adjusted
voting population total of22,8 million (State of the Voters RoU, 31ApriI1999). The data indicate
that only 18 172 751 or 79,7% of the voting population had registered successfully, and were
eligible to vote on election day. This figure co-incidentally corresponds with the "Opinion '99"
research findings conducted five days before the elections, which indicated that 79% of potential
voters had registered over the registration period (Business Day, 10 June 1999). According to
the latest "Opinion'99" (June 1999) poll, discrepancies in registration levels between the race
groups could perhaps be explained to a skew rate of possession of barcoded identity documents
among different racial groups (Business Day, 10 June 1999). The poll shows a 92% barcoded ID
possession (92%) among the Blacks, and a 79% among the Indians and Coloureds. With the
majority of the Western Cape population being Coloured." it is tempting to consider the
barcoded ID issue as a partial explanation for a lower registration rate in that Province. By the
same token, Gauteng and Mpumalanga should, and do, portray relatively high registration
figures (Table 5.6). As discussed in earlier chapters, registration in Kwaóulu-Natal, Eastern
Cape and the Free State was severely disrupted by heavy rains during the first period of
35
36
Based on a new voting population total of 22.8million as per the IEC's State of the Voters' roll (1999).
In addition, Dr Steven Robins' February opinion poll among the Worcester Coloured Community indicated
further disillusionment on poor Government delivery, which could have caused protests in the form of non-
political participation (EISA, 1999(6)).
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registration. It remains questionable whether these provinces did in fact recover from their poor
rate of registration.
19. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The data from this text indicate that the registration process suffered from a series of problems
including the lEC's budget constraints, staff shortages, bad weather, court cases, youth apathy a
generally low registration turnout. Having completed the registration process at the rate of
79,7% of 22,8 million voters, the IEC had to, understandably, be pleased at having exceeded its
goal." As much as this was an achievement under the given circumstances, it may be queried
whether this percentage was high enough, bearing in mind that it is rare to secure a 100% voter
registration in any election. Another question relates to whether the IEC could have done more
than it did to secure a higher registration rate and whether such an expectation would have been
realistic. It may also be asked whether this figure could have been different if the barcoded ID's
had not been a limitation during voter registration. It is the aim of the next chapter to analyse
the policy and entire registration process in a summary form, and to try to find explanatory
answers regarding a series of questions that have been raised in this and the preceding chapters.
37 According to The Star (8 March 1999), Mchunu of the lEC indicated on 4 March 1999 that a registration rate
of 70% was the minimum target of the Commission.
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CHAPTER6
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSION
1. SUMMARY
The aim of this study has been to make an analytical description of the policy, as well as the
process, of voter registration in South Africa for the 1999 elections. The significance of the
study lies in the fact that voter registration is taking place for the first time in the short history of
the country's democratic elections. As the process of voter registration is new in South Africa it
is almost certain that practical experience is still lacking. In view of the limited information on
the subject it was logical to conduct an exploratory study on this new phenomenon in South
Africa. A thorough understanding of any new policy is vital for minimising any
misinterpretations due to ignorance, and for facilitating a theoretical and political debate which
can contribute to the improvement of the policy, should such a need arise. Understanding new
phenomena is a complex process, which involves both questions and answers. There has been no
exception in needing the question and answer dichotomy in an attempt to understand this policy.
Chief to these questions is the need to know the necessity of this policy in South Africa. Another
fundamental question refers to the policy making process, i.e. how the policy was made. In
trying to explore the third question regarding the viability of this policy in South Africa, it
became necessary for the implementation process to be studied as well.
In an attempt to explore the policy of voter registration, several questions were asked at the
beginning of the study, including that of the actual description of the concept of voter
registration. Chapter one describes the policy of voter registration in South Africa as a section of
the legislative and statutory provisions of the elections which provides for voters to be registered
on the voters' roll in order to qualify to vote. This policy requires all potential voters to possess a
green South African barcoded identity document in order to register for voting. The policy and
its provisions which constitute new limitations in the short voting history of democratic South
Africa have raised several other questions such as the need for a thorough understanding as to
why this policy has been necessary for South Africa for the 1999 elections, and why it was
omitted in the 1994 elections. The data in chapter two suggest that the omission of this limitation
in 1994 left the electoral process vulnerable to electoral fraud. The types of electoral fraud
reported after the 1994 elections included incidents of multiple voting, voting by non-residents
as well as an uncontrollable movement of the electorate between regions during the voting
period. These loopholes were made possible by the existence of a variety of identity documents
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held by the public and used for voting purposes. According to the ANC, the supply of multiple
copies of some types of identity document remained highly possible and their validity difficult
to verify, thus making the above types of alleged fraud possible. Although none of these
allegations could be fully substantiated, the Government and the Electoral Commission decided
to improve the rules in an attempt to eliminate the chances of it happening in future. To achieve
this, Electoral Act no 73 of 1998 was passed replacing Electoral Act no 202 of 1993.
Since the preceding act could not provide for the use of the voters' roll, the new act included
requirements for voters to be registered in the voters' roll in order to qualify for voting in South
Africa. The policy of voter registration further requires the voters to be in possession of a green
barcoded identity document in order to register for voting. In justifying the need for the policy,
the policy makers argued that the use of a barcoded ID would ensure that entrance to the voters'
roll is limited to legitimate voters only. It was further argued that this ID is easily verifiable as
compared to other types of South African ID's since it is issued in terms of the records held in
the population register." The population register, according to the argument, consists of
residential, citizenship, and other personal information necessary for distinguishing between
enfranchised and disenfranchised persons. Moreover, the provision that voters should register
only in areas where they intend to vote addresses the problem of voters transferring between
regions during elections. Following this explanation is the description of the actual policy
making process, i.e. the answer how was this policy made? Who were the participants in the
policy making process, and how were the decisions taken?
1.1 The Policy Making Process
An understanding of this process requires a description of whether the decision making process
was inclusive of all stakeholders or was undertaken unilaterally by a certain political cabal,
whether the policy does or does not contradict any constitutional provision, and whether it is
viable for implementation in South Africa. The findings in Chapter 3 indicate that all political
parties represented in Parliament participated in the debates on the Electoral Bill. Further, that
all political parties, with the exception of the DP and the NNP, had accepted the Bill and its
provisions, resulting in the Bill being passed on 17 September 1998 and becoming the Electoral
Act no 73 Of 1998. The debate around this Act was not procedurally different from any other
law-making process and can be safely regarded as inclusive and legitimate. Although the law-
making procedure could not be contested, the NNP and the DP remained dissatisfied with the
38 The DP official, Kalyan, opposes this argument, arguing that barcoded !D's are available even in the black
market and are being sold to Nigerians and other illegal aliens who wish to obtain RSA citizenship (Interview:
Kalyan, I999).
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constitutionality of the provision for barcoded ID's in the Act. As a result, they challenged this
provision in the High Court. The NNP applied to the Cape Division of the High Court whilst the
DP applied to the Transvaal Division January 1999 to lodge an appeal against the barcoded ID
stipulation in the Electoral Act. Both parties were requesting the Court to declare the limitation
of barcoded ID's as provided in section I(xii) of the Electoral Act 73 of 1998, as
unconstitutional. The complaint against the provision was that it disenfranchised the non-holders
of barcoded identity documents. This disenfranchisement was alleged to be a contradiction of
the constitutional right to a universal adult suffrage. Further, the parties were seeking a Court
order against the conduct of the Ministers of Home Affairs, and of Finance, which the NNP to
be infringing upon the independence and impartiality of the IEC, so that their conduct could be
declared as invalid and unconstitutional. The alleged conduct of the Ministers was as follows:
1. Financial constraints placed by the Minister of Finance on the lEC;
2. Interfering with the powers of the lEC to carry out its duties and functions as described in
sections 5 and 12 of the Electoral Commission Act, and sections 4, 5 and 14 of the
Electoral Act, as well as sections 181 and 190 of the Constitution. These sections basically
prescribe the main duties of the lEC to organise and administer the free and fair elections
in an unbiased manner. The NNP felt that financial constraints limits the capacity of the
lEC to carry out such duties;
3. Withholding of barcoded identity documents issued by the Department of Home Affairs
around the country, without delivering them to persons who applied for them, without
affording proper notices to such applicants. The Parties also argued that the Department of
Home Affairs lacked the capacity to supply new documents according to increasing
demand within a limited time frame.
When passing judgement, both the Cape and Transvaal Divisions of the High Court ruled
against these applications. The majority of judges felt that the provision for barcoded ID's would
benefit the electoral system by eliminating electoral fraud. The HSRC survey results used by the
NNP as evidence for a low rate of possession of barcoded ID's was already outdated by the time
the cases were heard. Allegations of a lack of capacity by the Department of Home Affairs, and
of the infringement of the independence and impartiality of the lEC, were inadequately
substantiated and were dismissed by the Court. The Parties were dissatisfied with the Judgement
and lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court. On 1 April 1999 the Constitutional Court
also judged against these parties for similar reasons to those given by the High Court. In a
separate case where the Prisoners' Union had challenged the disenfranchisement of its members,
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the Constitutional Court judged in favour of the Union. The Court felt that a total
disenfranchisement of prisoners was unconstitutional and ordered the IEC to register those
prisoners who were not precluded by the Electoral Act from voting. As a result, the IEC was
faced with the task of registering about 146 000 prisoners countrywide. The IEC later indicated
that, after its efforts, only a small number of prisoners were prepared to come forward and be
registered. As a result, only 21 430 prisoners were registered (Table 5.2).
1.2 The Implementation of policy
As explained in chapter 3 sub-section 3, the prescribing Act to the policy and process of voter
registration, Electoral Act (no 73 of 1998) owes its origin to the recommendations of the
Electoral Steering Committee of 1996, as well as to the Electoral Amendment Bill (B90-96) of
1996. This Act was only passed on 14 October 1998, resulting in the IEC having little time to
prepare for registrations, as Judge Langa of the Constitutional Court argued in a judgement
during the barcoded ID court cases. For the implementation to take place the IEC needed to, and
did prepare the following: The demarcation of voting districts, the zip-zip barcode reading
machines, acquiring personnel, the registration time table, a public information strategy, and
arrangements for safety and security during registration (see chapter 4). The actual
implementation of the policy began with the opening of registration, a process which was
divided into three rounds beginning on 27 November 1998 and ending with the final stage on 15
March 1999.
1.3 Registration Round-One
As the data in chapter 2 indicate, the first registration ran over a six39 day period divided into
two phases, the first for the northern Provinces during 27-29 November, and the second for the
four southern Provinces of KZN, Eastern Cape, Free State and the Western Cape during 3, 4,
and 5 December 1998. Registration was dominated by problems of staff shortages, non opening
of registration stations, poor or misinformation to the public regarding registration venues,
heavy rainfall in the southern Provinces, as well as a registration apathy on the part of the youth.
These difficulties were the major, although not sole reasons for the low registration turnout as
only 37,0% of the voting population of 26355 840 could be registered in this round. This low
percentage resulted in the planning by the IEC of a second round of registration from 29-31
January 1999.
39 See registration time table in chapter 4 :49
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1.4 Registration Round-Two
Having learnt from the problems of the first round, the lEe tried to improve its information
capabilities by advertising in taxi ranks, African-language radio stations, as well as holding road
shows where senior lEe officials appeared and encouraged registration. This improved
registration resulted in a further 19,0% of registered voters and this increased the national rate to
56,0% by the end of the second round of registration. This rate being lower than the lEe target
of 80,0% the lEe was forced to plan a third round of registration, which took place during the
first two weeks of March 1999.
1.5 Registration Round-Three
The aim of the third round was to take registration beyond the 56,0% obtained at the end of the
second round. This required preparations in the form of various public awareness campaigns by
the lEe and the Government, including the following campaigns:
1.5.1 The Votani Mawethu Campaign
In this campaign the Department of Home Affairs was engaged in a countrywide campaign to
persuade the public to apply for barcoded ID's. This included visits to the East Rand Townships
by officials of the Department of Home Affairs. It can be said that the campaign was a success
since it resulted in long queues of ID applicants in most Home Affairs offices countrywide.
1.5.2 Campaign through Sport
Registration campaigns were extended to an international soccer match between South Africa
and Gabon, as well as to a rugby match in Pretoria on 27 February 1999. Pamphlets were
distributed to the fans, teams displayed the lEe T-shirts and promotional messages were also
flown at these events. The impact of these campaigns is however, because of their indirect
nature, not measurable in tangible quantities.
1.6 The Voters' Roll
In order to finalise the registration process the lEe decided to update the voters' roll by
reconciling it with the population register. The roll was finalised in a meeting between the lEe,
the Department of Home Affairs, and Statistics South Africa, which was held on 4 March 1999
in Pretoria. The outcome of the meeting was the reduction of the voting population from
26355 840 (as per Table 4.3) to a revised total of 22,8 million, which was likely to increase the
percentage of registered voters. The original total was misleading in that it included a significant
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number of the non-voting population such as the under aged, prisoners, South Africans living
abroad, South Africans without barcoded ID's, South Africans recorded as deceased in the
population register, as well as non-permanent residents. The resuIt of the revision was the
removal of approximately 120000 people from the voters' roll, after this revision, registered
voters were allowed to check their names against the voters' roll, to raise objections and to apply
for corrections.
1.7 The Final Registration
The final round took place on 5, 6 and 7 March 1999. The process was reported to have
progressed smoothly with the registration rate approaching 16 million (or 70% of the updated
voting population) on the final day. This period was further extended to 12-15 March to allow
for late applications.
1.8 Finalising the Voters' Roll
In response to calls for further extensions of registration by VanSchalkwyk of the NNP, the IEC
indicated that it needed to close registrations so that it could finalise the voters' roll by 12 April.
This finalisation was necessary so that the IEC could in turn deal with appeals and corrections
well ahead of the elections on 2 June 1999. Finalising the voters' roll depended largely on the
outcome of cases being heard by the Constitutional Court which were finalised on 1 April.
Although the Court ruled against the DP and the NNP, its judgement was in favour of the
prisoners' Union, resulting in the IEC being ordered to register about 146 000 prisoners
nationally, before the voters' roll could be finalised. The registration of prisoners took place on
16, 17 and 18 April 1999 over 236 prisons nation-wide. Due to low interest on the part of the
prisoners, only 21 430 prisoners were registered out of a national total of 146 000 prisoners (see
Table 5.2).
In finalising the roll, the IEC de-registered a total of 265203 voters from the voters' roll (see
Table 5.3 for details). Of this total the IEC reinstated a total of 38782 voters on receipt of their
appeals (see Table 5.4 for details). The final registration rate at the end of registration was
79,7% (see Table 5.6 for details). Its is well to bear in mind that these registrations were the first
of their kind in the history of South Africa's elections, there was no past experience with which
their progress could be compared. As a result, only a circumstantial evaluation is possible. In
this respect, using the IEC target of 80% registration as a yardstick, given the nature of
difficulties in the form of budgetary constraints, staff shortages, and court cases, it is
understandable that the IEC considered this process as having been a resounding success.
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2. CONCLUSION
The chief aim of this study has been the exploration of the reasons behind the decision for the
policy of voter registration in South Africa during the 1999 General Election, as opposed to the
omission of this policy in the first General Election of 1994. Attempts to address this question
required a description of the political, Constitutional and legislative electoral developments
towards this policy. In addition, an account had to be given of the 1994 Election which had
excluded this policy; it was necessary to explore the possible reasons why such a policy had to
be instated for the next elections of 1999. As the data in Chapter two indicate, the lack of a
voters' roll in 1994 made the electoral process open to possibilities of electoral fraud such as
multiple voting, as well as possible voting by non-citizens. Although allegations that were made
of these instances in the 994 elections could not be substantiated, the policy makers considered
that the registration of voters would minimise, if not eliminate, these possibilities in future
elections. As a result, the policy of voter registration was initiated. As stipulated in Electoral Act
no 73 of 1998, the policy requires citizens to be registered on the voters' roll in order to qualify
to vote in a General Election. In addition, a citizen should possess a South African barcoded
identity document in order to be able to register to vote. The latter stipulation had given rise to a
heated debate between the Government and the IEC on one hand, and the DP as well as the NNP
on the other, with the latter parties pursuing their opposing to the provision as far as the
Constitutional Court. This stipulation was opposed on the basis that it would deprive the non-
holders of barcoded ID's of their constitutional right to vote. By implication, it was alleged that
this provision would lead to a decreased voter turnout as a result of the exclusion of non-holders
of this type oflD.
The argument that the absence of a voters' roll had made alleged cases of electoral fraud possible
in 1994, and that the use of a voters' roll in 1999 could eliminate the opportunity for such fraud
requires a thorough evaluation of the whole election process, an exercise beyond the scope of
this essay. Although very few, if any, of the problems concerning electoral fraud from the 1994
Election were reported at the end of the 1999 Election, a comparative study of the 1994 and
1999 Elections is required in order to arrive at a definite conclusion. To this effect, this study
could be a contributing base.
To the second set of arguments, firstly, that the provision of barcoded ID's is unconstitutional
since it denies a constitutional voting right to non-holders of the document, the Constitutional
Court ruled that the stipulation would only be unconstitutional if it prevents individuals from
applying for ID's and also from registering to vote. In addition, that the stipulation would be
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illegitimate if the Government had not made conditions to be conducive for voters to take
reasonable steps to get registered and to vote. According to the Court, none of these
requirements had been infringed by this stipulation nor by the Government. In fact, the Court
found that many people who had wanted to register and to vote, who had taken reasonable steps
to do so, had in fact been registered successfully. As a result, the provision could not be declared
as unconstitutional. Instead, the Court felt that the use of a single form of identity document as
set out in this stipulation would improve the legitimacy of an electoral system by minimising the
chances of electoral fraud. In view of these arguments, until further research provides adequate
evidence against these findings of the Court, there is no logical reason for not concluding that a
barcoded ID stipulation is not unconstitutional.
In evaluating the argument that the provision, as it excludes non-holders of barcoded ID's from
voting would lead to a lower registration turnout, comparisons between the total voting
population and the total percentage of registered voters, and between the total voting population
and the total percentage poll is necessary.
It is hard to find any supporting evidence for the above claim. Firsly, Table 5.6 indicates an 80%
registration rate despite the barcoded ID stipulation. Secondly, the data in Table 5.3 indicate a
less than significant percentage of identity documents related problems during registration. In
addition this study has not found enough evidence in this study to suggest a negative correlation
between the stipulation for barcoded ID's and the registration turnout. According to the
following data on the election results (Table 6.1), it is even more difficult to find any evidence to
support the argument of a negative causal relationship between the stipulation and the voter turn
out. Where such a relationship is claimed, e.g. the low incidence of possession barcoded ID's by
Coloured people in the Western Cape and the low registration rate in the Province as shown by
"Opinion'99" conducted five days before the election, there is no conclusive evidence that
barcoded ID's alone were the cause. If there was another factor, i.e. protest against poor delivery
of service delivery by Government as indicated in the Worcester survey'" of February 1999
(EISA, 1999(6):11-12), it cannot be proven to what extent each factor, and the other factor, in
relation to the other factor had caused a low registration turnout.
40 Dr Steven Robins of the University of the Western Cape had conducted an opinion poll on political interest
among the Coloured population in Worcester during February 1999. The fmdings indicated a decrease in
political interest due to dissatisfaction with local Government service delivery. Protest against in political
participation was predicted (EISA, 1999(6): 11-12).
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Table 6.1: 1999 National Election Verified Result
Total Voting Population Registered population Number of Ballots 0/0
22, 8 million 18172 751 (80%)
Total spoilt ballots ---+ 251320 1,55%
Total Valid ballots ---+ 15 977 142 87,75%
22,8million 18 172 751 (80%) Total Ballots ----. 16 228462 89,30%
Source: RSA Government Gazette no 20201, 11 June 1999
In addition, were such a relationship between the policy and voter turnout to exist, it would more
likely be evident in the case of registration turnout, or voter registration on voter turnout. The
data in Table 6.1 do give any indication to this effect in the 1999 General Elections in South
Africa. In the case of the effect of voter registration on voter turnout, it would be illogical to
make any conclusion based on the first experience of this process in the country, as very little
research has been conducted in this specific subject in the country. Studies on similar subject
have been conducted only in foreign countries where voter registration has been in operation for
several decades. As alluded to in Chapter two, American studies have indicated that the
registration of voters does tend to contribute to lower voter turnouts in the long run. What has
just been experienced in South Africa in the recent General Election is the effect of youth apathy
on registration. In fact, low registration turnout has been a concern in the United States of
America for decades.
According to the National Municipal League in America, one of the major reasons for lower
registration percentages is the fact that the registration burden rests on the citizens (Comment,
1984:104). The League recommends a voter registration model that will address this problem. In
this model the states (or provinces in the South African context) should assume responsibility by
conducting a statewide door-to-door canvass of all households. This should be done
systematically, every one or two years, to register eligible voters and to remove the names of
voters no longer residing at a registered address (Comment, 1984: 104-5). The League believes
that this method could increase the registration turnout among potential voters while
continuously keeping the voters' roll up to date every time.
In the first voter registration in South Africa there were many factors which could have
contributed to a low registration rate. As a result, it would not be easy to determine the extent
each factor might have had on lower voter registration turnout, if 80% should be considered as
low at all. Since voter registration took taking place for the first time in the 1999 General
Election in South Africa, conclusions about the impact of the registration process on voter
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turnout lack a local comparative aspect. In fact, at this stage such conclusions would be
premature and speculative.
3. RECOMMENDATIONS
It should be pointed out that this has been an exploratory study on the first experience of voter
registration in South Africa. As a result, wild claims and conclusions have not been made.
Obviously because of the limited availability of pertinent local publications or experiences on
the subject.
In this study the problem of apathy by first time voters has become evident. Due to a large
number of possible factors that could have led to this trend, including the requirement for
specific ID's, lack of voter education, lack of political interest, it has not been possible to analyse
this trend beyond the descriptive level. Although it is not suggested that apathy by first time
voters resulted directly from voter registration, perhaps the policy makers should ask themselves
if there are any lessons to be learnt from an electoral systems model such as that proposed by
America's National Municipal League which could prevent a further decrease in registration
turnout in future.
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